CWE - CWE-36: Absolute Path Traversal (4.19.1)
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    CWE-36: Absolute Path Traversal

    Weakness ID: 36
    Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
    Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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    + Description
    The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize absolute path sequences such as "/abs/path" that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.
    + Extended Description
    This allows attackers to traverse the file system to access files or directories that are outside of the restricted directory.
    + Common Consequences
    Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
    Impact Details

    Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

    		Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

    The attacker may be able to create or overwrite critical files that are used to execute code, such as programs or libraries.

    Modify Files or Directories

    		Scope: Integrity

    The attacker may be able to overwrite or create critical files, such as programs, libraries, or important data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, appending a new account at the end of a password file may allow an attacker to bypass authentication.

    Read Files or Directories

    		Scope: Confidentiality

    The attacker may be able read the contents of unexpected files and expose sensitive data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, by reading a password file, the attacker could conduct brute force password guessing attacks in order to break into an account on the system.

    DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

    		Scope: Availability

    The attacker may be able to overwrite, delete, or corrupt unexpected critical files such as programs, libraries, or important data. This may prevent the product from working at all and in the case of a protection mechanisms such as authentication, it has the potential to lockout every user of the product.
    + Potential Mitigations
    Phase(s) Mitigation

    Implementation

    Strategy: Input Validation

    Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

    When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

    Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

    When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.

    Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

    Effectiveness: High

    Implementation

    Strategy: Input Validation

    Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

    Operation

    Strategy: Firewall

    Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

    Effectiveness: Moderate

    Note: An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
    + Relationships
    Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
    + Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 37 Path Traversal: '/absolute/pathname/here'
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 38 Path Traversal: '\absolute\pathname\here'
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 39 Path Traversal: 'C:dirname'
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 40 Path Traversal: '\\UNC\share\name\' (Windows UNC Share)
    + Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
    + Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
    + Modes Of Introduction
    Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
    Phase Note
    Implementation
    + Applicable Platforms
    Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
    Languages

    Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

    Technologies

    Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

    Class: Web Based (Undetermined Prevalence)

    AI/ML (Undetermined Prevalence)

    + Demonstrative Examples

    Example 1


    In the example below, the path to a dictionary file is read from a system property and used to initialize a File object.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: Java 
    String filename = System.getProperty("com.domain.application.dictionaryFile");
    File dictionaryFile = new File(filename);

    However, the path is not validated or modified to prevent it from containing relative or absolute path sequences before creating the File object. This allows anyone who can control the system property to determine what file is used. Ideally, the path should be resolved relative to some kind of application or user home directory.



    Example 2


    This script intends to read a user-supplied file from the current directory. The user inputs the relative path to the file and the script uses Python's os.path.join() function to combine the path to the current working directory with the provided path to the specified file. This results in an absolute path to the desired file. If the file does not exist when the script attempts to read it, an error is printed to the user.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: Python 
    import os
    import sys
    def main():
    filename = sys.argv[1]
    path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), filename)
    try:
    with open(path, 'r') as f:
    file_data = f.read()
    except FileNotFoundError as e:
    print("Error - file not found")
    main()

    However, if the user supplies an absolute path, the os.path.join() function will discard the path to the current working directory and use only the absolute path provided. For example, if the current working directory is /home/user/documents, but the user inputs /etc/passwd, os.path.join() will use only /etc/passwd, as it is considered an absolute path. In the above scenario, this would cause the script to access and read the /etc/passwd file.

    (good code)
    Example Language: Python 
    import os
    import sys
    def main():
    filename = sys.argv[1]
    path = os.path.normpath(f"{os.getcwd()}{os.sep}{filename}")
    if path.startswith("/home/cwe/documents/"):
    try:
    with open(path, 'r') as f:
    file_data = f.read()
    except FileNotFoundError as e:
    print("Error - file not found")
    main()

    The constructed path string uses os.sep to add the appropriate separation character for the given operating system (e.g. '\' or '/') and the call to os.path.normpath() removes any additional slashes that may have been entered - this may occur particularly when using a Windows path. The path is checked against an expected directory (/home/cwe/documents); otherwise, an attacker could provide relative path sequences like ".." to cause normpath() to generate paths that are outside the intended directory (CWE-23). By putting the pieces of the path string together in this fashion, the script avoids a call to os.path.join() and any potential issues that might arise if an absolute path is entered. With this version of the script, if the current working directory is /home/cwe/documents, and the user inputs /etc/passwd, the resulting path will be /home/cwe/documents/etc/passwd. The user is therefore contained within the current working directory as intended.



    + Selected Observed Examples

    Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

    Reference Description
    Product for managing datasets for AI model training and evaluation allows both relative (CWE-23) and absolute (CWE-36) path traversal to overwrite files via the Content-Disposition header
    Python package constructs filenames using an unsafe os.path.join call on untrusted input, allowing absolute path traversal because os.path.join resets the pathname to an absolute path that is specified as part of the input.
    Multiple FTP clients write arbitrary files via absolute paths in server responses
    ZIP file extractor allows full path
    Path traversal using absolute pathname
    Path traversal using absolute pathname
    Path traversal using absolute pathname
    Arbitrary files may be overwritten via compressed attachments that specify absolute path names for the decompressed output.
    Mail client allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via an e-mail message containing a uuencoded attachment that specifies the full pathname for the file to be modified.
    Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via a full pathname to the target file in config parameter.
    Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via an absolute pathname.
    Remote attackers can read arbitrary files by specifying the drive letter in the requested URL.
    FTP server allows remote attackers to list arbitrary directories by using the "ls" command and including the drive letter name (e.g. C:) in the requested pathname.
    FTP server allows remote attackers to list the contents of arbitrary drives via a ls command that includes the drive letter as an argument.
    Server allows remote attackers to browse arbitrary directories via a full pathname in the arguments to certain dynamic pages.
    Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via an HTTP request whose argument is a filename of the form "C:" (Drive letter), "//absolute/path", or ".." .
    FTP server read/access arbitrary files using "C:\" filenames
    FTP server allows a remote attacker to retrieve privileged web server system information by specifying arbitrary paths in the UNC format (\\computername\sharename).
    + Weakness Ordinalities
    Ordinality Description
    Primary
    (where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
    + Detection Methods
    Method Details

    Automated Static Analysis
    Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

    Effectiveness: High
    + Functional Areas
    • File Processing
    + Affected Resources
    • File or Directory
    + Memberships
    Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 981 SFP Secondary Cluster: Path Traversal
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1404 Comprehensive Categorization: File Handling
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1436 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
    + Vulnerability Mapping Notes
    Usage ALLOWED
    (this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
    Reason Acceptable-Use

    Rationale

    		This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

    Comments

    		Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
    + Taxonomy Mappings
    Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
    PLOVER Absolute Path Traversal
    Software Fault Patterns SFP16 Path Traversal
    + References
    [REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 9, "Filenames and Paths", Page 503. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
    [REF-1448] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities in Software". 2024-05-02.
    <https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-design-alert-eliminating-directory-traversal-vulnerabilities-software>. (URL validated: 2024-07-14)
    [REF-1481] D3FEND. "D3FEND: Application Layer Firewall".
    <https://d3fend.mitre.org/dao/artifact/d3f:ApplicationLayerFirewall/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
    + Content History
    + Submissions
    Submission Date Submitter Organization
    2006-07-19
    (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)     		PLOVER
    + Modifications
    Modification Date Modifier Organization
    2025-12-11
    (CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
    2025-09-09
    (CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Affected_Resources, Applicable_Platforms, Functional_Areas, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
    2024-11-19
    (CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples
    2024-07-16
    (CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References
    2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Mapping_Notes
    2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
    2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Description
    2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Observed_Examples
    2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples
    2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms
    2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns
    2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations
    2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
    2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
    2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples
    2008-10-14 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Description
    2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
    updated Time_of_Introduction
    2008-07-01 Sean Eidemiller Cigital
    added/updated demonstrative examples
    Page Last Updated: January 21, 2026