CWE - CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type (4.19.1)
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    CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

    Weakness ID: 434
    Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
    Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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    + Description
    The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment. Diagram for CWE-434
    + Alternate Terms
    Unrestricted File Upload
    Used in vulnerability databases and elsewhere, but it is insufficiently precise. The phrase could be interpreted as the lack of restrictions on the size or number of uploaded files, which is a resource consumption issue.
    + Common Consequences
    Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
    Impact Details

    Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

    		Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

    Arbitrary code execution is possible if an uploaded file is interpreted and executed as code by the recipient. This is especially true for web-server extensions such as .asp and .php because these file types are often treated as automatically executable, even when file system permissions do not specify execution. For example, in Unix environments, programs typically cannot run unless the execute bit is set, but PHP programs may be executed by the web server without directly invoking them on the operating system.
    + Potential Mitigations
    Phase(s) Mitigation

    Architecture and Design
    Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]

    Architecture and Design

    Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

    When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

    Architecture and Design
    Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]

    Implementation

    Strategy: Input Validation

    Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

    When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

    Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

    For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.

    Architecture and Design
    Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.

    Implementation

    Strategy: Input Validation

    Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]

    Implementation
    When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.

    Architecture and Design
    For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

    Implementation
    Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.

    Implementation
    Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.

    Architecture and Design; Operation

    Strategy: Environment Hardening

    Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

    Architecture and Design; Operation

    Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

    Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.

    OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.

    This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.

    Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

    Effectiveness: Limited

    Note: The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.
    + Relationships
    Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
    + Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
    PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 351 Insufficient Type Distinction
    PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 430 Deployment of Wrong Handler
    PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 436 Interpretation Conflict
    PeerOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 646 Reliance on File Name or Extension of Externally-Supplied File
    CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 73 External Control of File Name or Path
    CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 183 Permissive List of Allowed Inputs
    CanFollow Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
    + Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 429 Handler Errors
    + Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 669 Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
    + Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1011 Authorize Actors
    + Modes Of Introduction
    Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
    Phase Note
    Implementation
    Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
    + Applicable Platforms
    Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
    Languages

    ASP.NET (Sometimes Prevalent)

    PHP (Often Prevalent)

    Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

    Technologies

    Web Server (Sometimes Prevalent)

    + Likelihood Of Exploit
    Medium
    + Demonstrative Examples

    Example 1


    The following code intends to allow a user to upload a picture to the web server. The HTML code that drives the form on the user end has an input field of type "file".

    (good code)
    Example Language: HTML 
    <form action="upload_picture.php" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">

    Choose a file to upload:
    <input type="file" name="filename"/>
    <br/>
    <input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit"/>

    </form>

    Once submitted, the form above sends the file to upload_picture.php on the web server. PHP stores the file in a temporary location until it is retrieved (or discarded) by the server side code. In this example, the file is moved to a more permanent pictures/ directory.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: PHP 

    // Define the target location where the picture being

    // uploaded is going to be saved.
    $target = "pictures/" . basename($_FILES['uploadedfile']['name']);

    // Move the uploaded file to the new location.
    if(move_uploaded_file($_FILES['uploadedfile']['tmp_name'], $target))
    {
    echo "The picture has been successfully uploaded.";
    }
    else
    {
    echo "There was an error uploading the picture, please try again.";
    }

    The problem with the above code is that there is no check regarding type of file being uploaded. Assuming that pictures/ is available in the web document root, an attacker could upload a file with the name:

    (attack code)
     
    malicious.php

    Since this filename ends in ".php" it can be executed by the web server. In the contents of this uploaded file, the attacker could use:

    (attack code)
    Example Language: PHP 
    <?php
    system($_GET['cmd']);

    ?>

    Once this file has been installed, the attacker can enter arbitrary commands to execute using a URL such as:

    (attack code)
     
    http://server.example.com/upload_dir/malicious.php?cmd=ls%20-l

    which runs the "ls -l" command - or any other type of command that the attacker wants to specify.



    Example 2


    The following code demonstrates the unrestricted upload of a file with a Java servlet and a path traversal vulnerability. The action attribute of an HTML form is sending the upload file request to the Java servlet.

    (good code)
    Example Language: HTML 
    <form action="FileUploadServlet" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">

    Choose a file to upload:
    <input type="file" name="filename"/>
    <br/>
    <input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit"/>

    </form>

    When submitted the Java servlet's doPost method will receive the request, extract the name of the file from the Http request header, read the file contents from the request and output the file to the local upload directory.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: Java 
    public class FileUploadServlet extends HttpServlet {
    ...

    protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
    response.setContentType("text/html");
    PrintWriter out = response.getWriter();
    String contentType = request.getContentType();

    // the starting position of the boundary header
    int ind = contentType.indexOf("boundary=");
    String boundary = contentType.substring(ind+9);

    String pLine = new String();
    String uploadLocation = new String(UPLOAD_DIRECTORY_STRING); //Constant value

    // verify that content type is multipart form data
    if (contentType != null && contentType.indexOf("multipart/form-data") != -1) {
    // extract the filename from the Http header
    BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(request.getInputStream()));
    ...
    pLine = br.readLine();
    String filename = pLine.substring(pLine.lastIndexOf("\\"), pLine.lastIndexOf("\""));
    ...

    // output the file to the local upload directory
    try {
    BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(uploadLocation+filename, true));
    for (String line; (line=br.readLine())!=null; ) {
    if (line.indexOf(boundary) == -1) {
    bw.write(line);
    bw.newLine();
    bw.flush();
    }
    } //end of for loop
    bw.close();


    } catch (IOException ex) {...}
    // output successful upload response HTML page
    }
    // output unsuccessful upload response HTML page
    else
    {...}
    }
    ...
    }

    This code does not perform a check on the type of the file being uploaded (CWE-434). This could allow an attacker to upload any executable file or other file with malicious code.

    Additionally, the creation of the BufferedWriter object is subject to relative path traversal (CWE-23). Since the code does not check the filename that is provided in the header, an attacker can use "../" sequences to write to files outside of the intended directory. Depending on the executing environment, the attacker may be able to specify arbitrary files to write to, leading to a wide variety of consequences, from code execution, XSS (CWE-79), or system crash.



    + Selected Observed Examples

    Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

    Reference Description
    PHP-based FAQ management app does not check the MIME type for uploaded images
    Web-based mail product stores ".shtml" attachments that could contain SSI
    PHP upload does not restrict file types
    upload and execution of .php file
    upload file with dangerous extension
    program does not restrict file types
    improper type checking of uploaded files
    Double "php" extension leaves an active php extension in the generated filename.
    ASP program allows upload of .asp files by bypassing client-side checks
    ASP file upload
    ASP file upload
    + Weakness Ordinalities
    Ordinality Description
    Primary
    (where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
    This can be primary when there is no check for the file type at all.
    Resultant
    (where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
    This can be resultant when use of double extensions (e.g. ".php.gif") bypasses a check.
    Resultant
    (where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)
    This can be resultant from client-side enforcement (CWE-602); some products will include web script in web clients to check the filename, without verifying on the server side.
    + Detection Methods
    Method Details

    Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Cost effective for partial coverage:
    • Web Application Scanner
    • Web Services Scanner
    • Database Scanners

    Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

    Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Cost effective for partial coverage:
    • Fuzz Tester
    • Framework-based Fuzzer

    Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

    Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Highly cost effective:
    • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
    • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

    Effectiveness: High

    Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Highly cost effective:
    • Source code Weakness Analyzer
    • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

    Effectiveness: High

    Architecture or Design Review

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Highly cost effective:
    • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
    Cost effective for partial coverage:
    • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

    Effectiveness: High
    + Functional Areas
    • File Processing
    + Affected Resources
    • File or Directory
    + Memberships
    Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 714 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A3 - Malicious File Execution
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 801 2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 813 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 864 2011 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 884 CWE Cross-section
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1131 CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1308 CISQ Quality Measures - Security
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1340 CISQ Data Protection Measures
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1364 ICS Communications: Zone Boundary Failures
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1416 Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Lifecycle Management
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1441 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A06:2025 - Insecure Design
    + Vulnerability Mapping Notes
    Usage ALLOWED
    (this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
    Reason Acceptable-Use

    Rationale

    		This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

    Comments

    		Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
    + Notes

    Relationship

    This can have a chaining relationship with incomplete denylist / permissive allowlist errors when the product tries, but fails, to properly limit which types of files are allowed (CWE-183, CWE-184).

    This can also overlap multiple interpretation errors for intermediaries, e.g. anti-virus products that do not remove or quarantine attachments with certain file extensions that can be processed by client systems.

    + Taxonomy Mappings
    Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
    PLOVER Unrestricted File Upload
    OWASP Top Ten 2007 A3 CWE More Specific Malicious File Execution
    OMG ASCSM ASCSM-CWE-434
    + References
    [REF-422] Richard Stanway (r1CH). "Dynamic File Uploads, Security and You".
    <https://web.archive.org/web/20090208005456/http://shsc.info/FileUploadSecurity>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
    [REF-423] Johannes Ullrich. "8 Basic Rules to Implement Secure File Uploads". 2009-12-28.
    <https://www.sans.org/blog/8-basic-rules-to-implement-secure-file-uploads/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
    [REF-424] Johannes Ullrich. "Top 25 Series - Rank 8 - Unrestricted Upload of Dangerous File Type". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-02-25.
    <https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-8-unrestricted-upload-of-dangerous-file-type/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
    [REF-76] Sean Barnum and Michael Gegick. "Least Privilege". 2005-09-14.
    <https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
    [REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 17, "File Uploading", Page 1068. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
    [REF-962] Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-434. 2016-01.
    <http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
    [REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
    <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
    + Content History
    + Submissions
    Submission Date Submitter Organization
    2006-07-19
    (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)     		PLOVER
    + Contributions
    Contribution Date Contributor Organization
    2024-02-29
    (CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)     		Abhi Balakrishnan
    Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
    + Modifications
    Modification Date Modifier Organization
    2025-12-11
    (CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2025-09-09
    (CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Detection_Factors, References
    2024-11-19
    (CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2024-07-16
    (CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Weakness_Ordinalities
    2024-02-29
    (CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Observed_Examples
    2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
    2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References, Relationships
    2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Alternate_Terms, Description
    2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References
    2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Research_Gaps
    2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples
    2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes
    2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Potential_Mitigations
    2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns
    2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Affected_Resources, Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
    2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Detection_Factors
    2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations
    2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References, Relationships
    2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
    2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations
    2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations
    2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References, Relationship_Notes
    2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns
    2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Type, Weakness_Ordinalities
    2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
    converted from Compound_Element to Weakness
    2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Functional_Areas, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
    2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
    updated Time_of_Introduction
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