| Accidental vulnerabilities in OSS code or Containers that we inherit |
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Automated patching, display OSS vulnerabilities as pull requests
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UPD-2, UPD-3
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| Intentional vulnerabilities/backdoors added to an OSS code base |
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Perform proactive security review of OSS
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SCA-5
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| A malicious actor compromises a known good OSS component and adds malicious code into the repo |
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Ability to block ingestion via malware scan, single feed, all packages are scanned for malware prior to download
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ING-3, ENF-2, SCA-4
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| A malicious actor creates a malicious package that is similar in name to a popular OSS component to trick developers into downloading it |
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OSS provenance analysis, single feed, all packages are scanned for malware prior to download
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AUD-1, ENF-2, SCA-4
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| A malicious actor compromises the compiler used by the OSS during build, adding backdoors |
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Rebuilding OSS on trusted build infrastructure ensures that packages don’t have anything injected at build time
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REB-1
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| Dependency confusion, package substitution attacks |
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Single feed, securely configure your package source mapping
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ENF-1, ENF-2
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| An OSS component adds new dependencies that are malicious |
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All packages are scanned for malware prior to download, single feed
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SCA-4, ENF-2
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| The integrity of an OSS package is tampered after build, but before consumption |
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Digital signature or hash verification, SBOM validation
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AUD-3, AUD-4
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| Upstream source can be removed or taken down which can then break builds that depend on that OSS component or container |
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Use package-caching solutions, mirror a copy of OSS source code to an internal location for Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BCDR) scenarios
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ING-2, ING-4
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| OSS components reach end-of-support/end-of-life and therefore don’t patch vulnerabilities |
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Scan OSS to determine if it is at end-of-life
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SCA-3
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| Vulnerability not fixed by upstream maintainer in desired timeframe |
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Implement a change in the code to address a zero-day vulnerability, rebuild, deploy to your organization, and confidentially contribute the fix to the upstream maintainer.
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FIX-1
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| Bad actor compromises a package manager account (e.g. npm), with no change to the corresponding open source repo, and uploads a new malicious version of a package |
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OSS provenance analysis, single feed, scan OSS for malware
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AUD-1, ENF-2, SCA-4
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