Naveed Khan

Security Researcher — Memory Safety · Protocol & Infrastructure Bugs · Web3 Audits
I break the code you never think about — before an attacker does.

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Every day you use software you'll never know the name of — the libraries that decode an image, parse a packet, compress a file, or read a byte. That invisible layer sits inside your browser, your phone, and the servers the internet runs on. It's also where the dangerous bugs survive, because almost nobody audits it.

That's where I work.

Over the last six months I've authored 270+ security & correctness pull requests across 80+ open-source projects — 100+ merged upstream. Every fix below is public, with my name on the commit.

🔎 Selected merged fixes

Project	Lang	The fix
liburing	C	Integer overflow in the io_uring allocator
libjxl	C++	Off-by-one heap OOB read in GIF palette decoding
libjxl	C++	Heap OOB read/write in alpha-blend path
libavif	C	Integer overflow in image rowBytes math
libzip	C	OOB read on empty archive entry name
Angular	TS	Comment-delimiter injection in escapeCommentText
Apache Commons BCEL	Java	Signed read of bytecode operands in classfile parser
Apache Commons Collections	Java	Deserialization invariant checks in map readObject
yyjson	C	Reject SIZE_MAX length in string allocator

_{…and 90+ more across OpenSSL, Apache, Dojo, npm, FlatBuffers, and others.}

🧠 Focus

memory-safety auditing · source-code review · fuzzing & crash triage · protocol conformance · smart-contract auditing (EVM & Move)

Bug classes I hunt: out-of-bounds read/write · integer overflow & truncation · sign-extension errors · unsafe deserialization · injection / escaping

🛠️ Toolkit

C · C++ · Java · Rust · Python · Solidity · Move ASan/UBSan · libFuzzer · OSS-Fuzz · GDB · Foundry / Hardhat

📫 Reach me

LinkedIn · dxbnaveed.k@gmail.com

_{The oldest, most boring corners of a codebase are where the bugs quietly wait.}