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Update module github.com/sigstore/rekor to v1.5.2 [SECURITY] (main)#3362
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Update module github.com/sigstore/rekor to v1.5.2 [SECURITY] (main)#3362renovate[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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ℹ️ Artifact update noticeFile name: acceptance/go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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File name: go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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This PR contains the following updates:
v1.5.0→v1.5.2Rekor has an OOM Condition due to Unbounded gzip Decompression in Alpine APK Parsing Logic
CVE-2026-48702 / GHSA-47q9-m4ww-924m
More information
Details
Description
The
Package.Unmarshal()function inpkg/types/alpine/apk.godecompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existingmax_apk_metadata_sizecheck (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory.An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine
ProposedEntry, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware.This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints:
Both invoke
V001Entry.Canonicalize()→fetchExternalEntities()→apk.Unmarshal(packageData), which performs the unbounded decompression.Workarounds
There is no effective workaround. Setting
max_request_body_sizereduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Settingmax_apk_metadata_sizehas no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
sigstore/rekor (github.com/sigstore/rekor)
v1.5.2Compare Source
Changelog
759b98ealpine: Enforce max size limit on decompression (#2831)c7e77eeSupport restricting kinds on insertion (#2814)a10818afix(trillianclient): strip dns:/// scheme from TLS ServerName in gRPC dial (#2812)8a2f3a2add checks to ensure returned entries match client inputs to rekor-cli (#2799)0e88bacadd nil pointer check to resolve fuzzing crash (#2807)93da954client: surface last-response details after retries are exhausted (#2796)4d67ecdFix internal error detail leakage in 500 responses (#2801)b34ca94add defensive check to ensure tid is in config ahead of getting client (#2795)656c832restapi: include inactiveShards in the homepage total count (#2797)Thanks for all contributors!
v1.5.1Compare Source
Features
Bug Fixes
Configuration
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