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Jackson 1 is prone to deserialization attacks as discussed by Moritz Bechler in his MarshalSec research. This patch disables the dangerous features of Jackson 1 but allows a user to supply a whitelist of packages allowed to be unmarshalled.
If an unexpected class is attempted to be unmarshalled a JsonMappingException is throw similar to what has been implemented in Jackson 2. A user on receiving this exception can re-run their application with a System Property "jackson.deserialization.whitelist.packages" which adds the fully qualified class name or package name of the class they would expect to be deserialized.