This release:

• replaces Spoof-VMM with T2TahoeFixup, thx @matteoiacca, @gandolf243 and @zkennedy137
• fixes a serious bug where boot.efi in both the T2 OpenCorePkg package and the non-T2 one were using the version from 1.0.4 instead of the latest one (2.0.7 for T2 Macs, 1.0.8 for the rest of the Macs). This could result in an unstable macOS 26 Tahoe and macOS 15 Sequoia installations, as OpenCore 1.0.4 was released long before Tahoe ever got announced at WWDC 2025. In fact, it was released around April 2025 or even earlier.

Non-T2 Macs:

• fixes the Wi-Fi root patches on macOS 26 Tahoe (#218). Since alpha 19.9.7 OpenCore loads Dortania's Tahoe AirPort kexts (AirPortBrcmNIC-Tahoe, AirPortAtheros40-Tahoe) on Tahoe, but the root patches still installed YBronst's macOS 15 Sequoia (-24) Wi-Fi frameworks on Tahoe. That paired the Tahoe kexts with frameworks that were never built or tested for them. Tahoe now uses Dortania's -25 root patches, like upstream (thx @Jazzzny and @dortania):
  • Modern Wireless (e.g. BCM4360 in the MacBookPro11,x): IO80211.framework, WiFiPeerToPeer.framework and wifip2pd from 13.7.2-25. The 13.7.2-25 folder in PatcherSupportPkg held a copy of YBronst's Sequoia build until now; Dortania's Tahoe binaries are restored there (PatcherSupportPkg 7c27d34, byte-identical to Dortania's PatcherSupportPkg 2.0.3).
  • Legacy Wireless: Dortania's 12.7.2-25 frameworks. YBronst's airportd, wps and wifip2pd builds still apply on Tahoe
• macOS 13 Ventura to macOS 15 Sequoia are not affected: the Wi-Fi root patches there keep using YBronst's builds
• since the repository for the Metallibs API has been renamed, the links are changed to point to the new repo's link to fix 404 error when trying to get the Metallibs
• changes the link to the new one for the instructions for T2 Macs to fix the 404 error when trying to open them

This release:

• on T2 Macs, now no longer allows flashing to the ESP if Windows or Linux is installed. On Linux is untested whether flashing OpenCore to the ESP causes issues, but on Windows 11 it results in This device needs to be repaired. Now if Windows is installed, it'll show this warning instead:

• fixes a bug in the Spoof-VMM.kext where on unsupported T2 Macs when trying to boot the installer causes a kernel panic
• updates the Intel Skylake and AMD Legacy GCN patches to fix a kernel panic on MacBookPro13,3 by updating PatcherSupportPkg to 2.0.8, thx @Jazzzny and @dortania

• fixes a vulnerability where an attacker could check if opencore_build_for_t2 is True to execute arbitary code:

  if self.opencore_build_for_t2 is not True:
              variant = f"NON-T2-{variant}"
          return f"OpenCore-{variant}.zip" # <- an attacker could execute arbitary code or launch a DoS attack
  

Impact: an attacker could check if the Mac is a T2 Mac or not and if yes, to execute arbitary code instead of injecting OpenCore to disk. Or worse, an attacker could inject OpenCore 2.0.7 that is known to cause issues on non-T2 Macs to intentionally corrupt the system. This vulnerability is fixed by ensuring OpenCore ever gets injected if the opencore_build_for_t2 condition exists and is set to either True or False.
T2 Macs:

• updates SpoofVMM from 4.9.1 to 4.9.6-alpha2 (payloads/Kexts/T2/SpoofVMM-4.9.6-alpha2-Release.zip), thx @Medelcartelinc:
  • in-kernel Stage 2 installer bypass: patches -[... runReturningError:] of OSIUpdateFirmwareElement, OSIVerifyROMElement, OSIInstallPersonalizedManifestsElement, OSIMSUInstallElement and OSIMSUCleanupElement to return success, so the installer no longer stops at the BridgeOS firmware step on T2 Macs Apple dropped from macOS 26 Tahoe. It is on by default; -spoofvmmnobypass, -spoofvmmnostage2 and -spoofvmmnocs turn it off for testing
  • the default bridge-model is now J214kAP (and hw.target reports the same), matching the default board-id Mac-5F9802EFE386AA28 (both MacBookPro16,2)
  • no new boot-args are needed: OCLP keeps adding -spoofvmmbid on unsupported T2 Macs only
• this is an alpha build of SpoofVMM and only a Release build exists, so the Release build is also used when kext debugging is enabled
• removes the RestrictEvents boot-args -revbeta and revpatch=sbvmm from T2 configs (also when left over from a template or older build). RestrictEvents is not injected on T2 Macs, so they had no effect; SpoofVMM handles the VMM spoof
• SpoofVMM is now only taken from the bundled release: the build no longer falls back to another SpoofVMM zip or to an old, previously extracted SpoofVMM.kext (possible when running from source), checks that the added kext really is 4.9.6, and stops with an error if the payload is missing. The second SpoofVMM injection in the T2 handling (logged as "3.0.0") uses the same path now
• this is not yet tested on real hardware. Please report whether Stage 2 of the Tahoe installer gets past "Failed to install a software update" (attach /var/log/install.log)

Non-T2 Macs:

• fixes MacBookPro11,1, 11,2 and 11,3 (2013/2014 Haswell) freezing at the Apple logo on macOS 15 Sequoia and macOS 26 Tahoe (#218). Since alpha 18 these models got the ProvideCurrentCpuInfo kernel quirk, which on Intel CPUs patches the core count to the thread count (meant for Alder Lake and other asymmetrical CPUs) and gave the kernel a wrong CPU topology. It is now only used on MacBookAir8,1 and 8,2 again. Rebuild and reinstall OpenCore to pick up the fix

This release:

• non-T2 Macs now get OpenCore 1.0.8 (payloads/OpenCore/OpenCore-NON-T2-{DEBUG,RELEASE}.zip) instead of the T2 OpenCorePkg fork. T2 Macs keep using the T2 fork (OpenCore-{DEBUG,RELEASE}.zip, 2.0.4). The payload is picked per build target, so building on a T2 Mac for a non-T2 Mac (and the other way round) uses the right one; the build log and #Revision > OpenCore-Version in config.plist show which version was used. The fork was never designed for non-T2 Macs and would cause issues if used on a non-T2 system, including stalls and kernel panics.

This release fixes root patching problems introduced or left over while porting Dortania's macOS 26 Tahoe patching scheme:

T2 Macs:

• fixes the AMD Vega patchset being offered on natively supported macOS versions: iMac Pro (2017) and MacBookPro15,1/15,3 with Vega graphics got the Monterey AMDRadeonX5000.kext installed over the native driver on Ventura, Sonoma and Sequoia. On CPUs with AVX2 the patchset is now only used on macOS 26 Tahoe and newer, and never on a Mac that Apple still supports on the running macOS (e.g. MacPro7,1 with Radeon Pro Vega II on Tahoe). CPUs without AVX2 behave as before (like Dortania)
• never enables the IOHIDFamily USB topcase panic kernel patch on T2 Macs (their keyboard, trackpad, Touch Bar and Touch ID are HID devices behind the T2; the patch skips IOHIDDevice::didTerminate() for every HID device). This was not reachable with current hardware detection and is a safeguard only

Other Macs:

• fixes Haswell, Ivy Bridge and NVIDIA Kepler Macs being only half patched on Tahoe: the GPU kexts were installed, but the Metal 3802 stack (Metal 13.2.1-25, MTLCompiler 13.6-25, GPUCompiler 13.2.1-25) was skipped unless Developer Mode was active. The Developer Mode gate is removed (ported from Dortania d622cd5), thx @Jazzzny and Dortania
• on Tahoe, Metal 3802 GPUs now get only the five prebuilt 26.0-3802 metallibs (Tungsten, RenderBox, VFX, VectorKit, AlloyCommonLibrary) instead of the Sequoia-era MetallibSupportPkg set, and MetallibSupportPkg is no longer required on Tahoe (ported from Dortania 9809024 and c70f40a), thx @Jazzzny and Dortania
• stops installing the Sequoia-era 3802 metallib set on Metal 31001 GPUs (Broadwell, Skylake, AMD GCN, Polaris, Vega, Navi) on Tahoe; they keep the RenderBox 26.0-3802 metallib via the Tahoe graphics patches, like Dortania
• re-enables AMD Legacy GCN graphics acceleration on Tahoe (iMac15,1 - iMac17,1, MacPro6,1 etc.) by removing the Developer Mode gate, like Dortania. The Legacy GCN color fix (AppleColorSyncLinearGamma) is now only applied on Tahoe, as on Polaris; it was also applied on Ventura - Sequoia before
• removes the old Moraea non-Metal leftovers, which the current non-Metal stack no longer uses (ported from Dortania bfe8f7c and a898811), thx @Jazzzny and Dortania:
  • the "Legacy Keyboard Backlight" patchset (Moraea_BacklightHack)
  • the SkyLightPlugins folder is no longer recreated during root patching, and the Monterey CoreWLAN SkyLight plugin is no longer installed
  • root patching and reverting now remove the old non-Metal preferences (Moraea_*, Amy.MenuBar2Beta and related keys)
  • the "Non-Metal Configuration" settings section and the automatic Moraea_BlurBeta default are removed

WiFi:

• fixes root patching aborting on every Mac that needs WiFi patches (Legacy and Modern Wireless, Monterey and newer): the patcher looked for YBronst's WiFi payloads in -YB folders, but PatcherSupportPkg ships them in the regular folders (no release ever contained -YB folders), so the preflight check failed with "Failed to find ...-YB..." and no patches at all were installed. The -YB suffix is gone; use_ybronst_wifi still keeps YBronst's approach of reusing the Sequoia (-24) builds on Tahoe, thx @YBronst and @Medelcartelinc

macOS installer creation:

• when creating a macOS installer, you can now erase only a single partition instead of the whole disk: after picking a disk, choose "Erase Entire Disk" (previous behavior) or "Choose Partition". Only the selected partition is reformatted, all other partitions on the disk stay untouched. APFS partitions are erased as a whole container (every volume inside it is lost, the dialog warns about this). Only partitions that can actually be used are listed: EFI, Recovery, reserved and too small partitions are not shown, and you get a warning if the disk doesn't use a GUID partition map
• macOS 26 Tahoe installers now need a disk or partition of at least 20 GB (previously 14 GB for all versions, which is too small for Tahoe); older macOS installers still need 14 GB
• the disk macOS is currently booted from is no longer offered for erasing, even if it is an external drive (e.g. when booting Tahoe from an external SSD)
• disk and partition identifiers are now validated before they are written into the installer script, which runs as root. Impact: none known, this is a safeguard only. The identifiers come from diskutil, but anything that ends up in a script run as root should never be trusted blindly

Security and OpenCore installation:

• hardens installing the launch services for the auto patcher: the files were prepared in a temporary folder the user can write to and then copied by root into /Library/LaunchDaemons without checking what was copied, so another process of the same user could swap them for its own root LaunchDaemon. They are now created in memory, written safely, and checked after installation (a mismatch removes the file and stops the install).
  Impact: local privilege escalation. Any program running as the logged-in user, without knowing the admin password, could get its own code installed as a LaunchDaemon and run as root at every boot (persistent root access). By replacing the staged file with a symlink, it could also make root copy a root-only file (e.g. password hashes) to a readable location. Exploiting this needs malicious code already running on the Mac and has to hit the short window while the launch services are being installed; it can't be triggered remotely
• the RSRMonitor launch daemon is no longer written into the app itself (this broke the app's code signature and failed on root-owned app bundles), and symlinks in /Library/Extensions are no longer included in its root cleanup.
  Impact: the broken code signature could make macOS refuse to open the app or report it as damaged. The symlink change is a safeguard only: creating entries in /Library/Extensions already needs root, and the cleanup removed the symlink itself, not what it points to
• before deleting the old EFI/OC and System folders as root when installing OpenCore, the target is now checked to be the selected FAT/EFI partition actually mounted there (custom mount points outside /Volumes still work).
  Impact: data loss, not an attack. If a wrong partition was passed in, root deleted EFI/OC, System and boot.efi on that drive. If the EFI reported no mount point, the paths were taken relative to the app's working directory, which is / when the app is opened from Finder, so root ran rm -rf on /System. With SIP's filesystem protection disabled (common after root patching), this could reach user data through /System/Volumes/Data
• fixes OpenCore installation crashing at the end in Recovery mode (UnboundLocalError) even though the install had succeeded; a failed unmount is now only logged as a warning. Impact: not a security issue; the crash made a successful install look like it had failed

This release:

• adds an end-of-life warning if it ever reaches end of life: if the main project repository (albert-mueller/OpenCore-Legacy-Patcher-T2) is archived or deleted, the main menu shows a warning on launch and a "Download OpenCore Legacy Patcher from Dortania" button that opens Dortania's latest release. The check runs once per launch in the background; a missing internet connection or a GitHub rate limit never triggers it, and a renamed repository still counts as active
• if the repository was deleted, or its name now belongs to a different repository (detected via GitHub's repository ID), the in-app updater stops using the official channel, so a re-registered account can't ship fake updates (same supply chain issue as the fork channels). An archived repository keeps the updater as is
• changes the link with instructions for T2 Macs from the previous repository: https://github.com/albert-mueller/OpenCore-Legacy-Patcher-T2-Instructions-for-T2-Macs to a now new website: https://albert-mueller.github.io/ . The previous repository will be gone and as such, if you are running older versions of OpenCore Legacy Patcher T2, now it will open a dead link.

This release:

• fixes a kernel panic on macOS 26 Tahoe on Macs with a USB top case (internal keyboard/trackpad driven by AppleUSBTopCase.kext): adds the IOHIDFamily USB topcase panic kernel patch (IOHIDDevice::didTerminate, MinKernel 25.0.0) and enables it wherever AppleUSBTopCase.kext is injected (ported from Dortania d147e58), thx @Jazzzny and Dortania
• fixes the NVIDIA Web Driver patchset on Tahoe: CoreDisplay now uses the 10.13.6-25 payload instead of the Sequoia one (ported from Dortania dd681ac), thx @Jazzzny and Dortania
• fixes the Skylake graphics patches on Tahoe: T1 Macs now get the KyberInTheSEPRegisteredKeys MessageProtection feature flag turned off during root patching (ported from Dortania b8ae03e), thx @Jazzzny and Dortania
• removes the Tahoe safety guard that skipped the Skylake graphics patchset unless DortaniaInternal was active
• fixes Skylake root patching on Ventura and Sonoma: AppleIntelSKLGraphicsMTLDriver.bundle was looked up in the 12.5-22 payload, which only contains the Broadwell driver; it now uses 12.5 like Dortania
• re-enables root patching for non-Metal GPUs (NVIDIA Web Driver, NVIDIA Tesla, AMD TeraScale 1/2, Intel Iron Lake/Sandy Bridge) on Tahoe by removing the safety guards added in 6d6eea9
• replaces the non-Metal shared patchsets (non_metal.py, non_metal_ioaccel.py, non_metal_coredisplay.py, non_metal_enforcement.py) with Dortania's current versions, so they use the Tahoe-era PatcherSupportPkg payloads. This affects every macOS version, not just Tahoe:
  • SkyLight: only the SkyLight/SkyLightOriginal binaries are replaced with a build matching the macOS version (26.7-25 on Tahoe) instead of merging the old 10.14.6 SkyLight.framework; the QuartzCore merge is gone
  • adds iconservicesagent from 26.0 on Tahoe
  • the IOSurface version is now chosen per GPU (10.14.6 for NVIDIA Web Driver and TeraScale 2, 10.15.7 for the rest)
  • removes fork-only additions: screencapture, the Screen Sharing bundles, the DropboxHack SkyLight plugin and the GlobalPreferences/WebKit defaults write tweaks
  • Macs with non-Metal GPUs that are already root patched should revert root patches and patch again, so the old SkyLight/QuartzCore files and plugins don't stay on the system
• hides fork update channels whose GitHub account or repository no longer exists (e.g. "Medelcartelinc (Fork)") from Settings > App > "Update Channel"; if such a channel was selected, the patcher automatically switches back to the official channel. A missing internet connection never counts as offline, and the channel reappears if the repository comes back. This mitigates a vulnerability where if the account ever gets banned or deleted, the channel remains the same and an attacker could launch a supply chain attack by registering the same, old name.

Impact: if Medelcartelinc's account ever gets banned or deleted, an attacker could set a fake GitHub repository to launch supply chain attacks by just sticking to the old channel. This vulnerability is fixed by ensuring that if the account ever gets banned or deleted, users are migrated safely to the main project instead.

• fixes another vulnerability where in the Ask Gemini handling in gui_build.py, an attacker could cause an unintended fallback or launch DoS attack:

                except Exception as clipboard_error:
                    logging.error(f"Failed to copy build log to clipboard: {clipboard_error}")
  
                if self.constants.detected_os >= os_data.os_data.big_sur:
                    logging.info("- Launching Gemini AI Assistant (wx.html2 WebView)")
                    gemini_window = gui_support.GeminiWebView(self, title="Gemini AI Assistant")
                    gemini_window.Show()
                else: # <- an attacker could cause unintended fallback or DoS by setting constants.detected_os to a specially crafted value
                    logging.info("- Launching Gemini AI Assistant (default web browser, host predates Big Sur)")
                    logging.info("macOS Catalina, Mojave and High Sierra can't load Gemini in Safari and WebKit because they're too old.")
                    webbrowser.open("https://gemini.google.com")
  

Impact: an attacker could set constants.detected_os inside gui_build.py to a specially crafted value to cause unintended fallback or crash the application to launch DoS attacks. This vulnerability is fixed by ensuring Gemini ever opens only if the version in constants.detected_os can be parsed.

This release:

• fixes a bug where smbios_data listed the 16-inch 2019 MacBook Pro supports maximum Sequoia, although Apple natively supports Tahoe on these models
• fixes a bug where on unsupported T2 Macs Spoof-VMM is enabled but none of the boot arguments are injected due to a bug where the logic checked if the Mac was running Tahoe instead of checking if it is unsupported by Tahoe

This release:

• fixes several vulnerabilities in the Privileged Helper Tool and the self signing workflow that allowed local privilege escalation to root without a password (see "Security fixes" below)
• create-signing-certificate.sh now keeps the signing key in its own locked keychain (oclp-signing.keychain-db, codesign-only access, auto-lock after 5 minutes and on sleep) instead of the login keychain, and can export the key off the machine (--export) and import it again (--import); Build-Project.command locks the keychain after every build
• adds verify-signature.sh to confirm a self signed (not notarized) build is your own before accepting the Gatekeeper warning; install.sh refuses unsigned or ad-hoc signed helpers and sets root:wheel 4755 explicitly
• moves the SpoofVMM kext payloads from payloads/Kexts/Acidanthera to the new payloads/Kexts/T2 folder, since SpoofVMM is not an Acidanthera kext

Security fixes - Privileged Helper Tool

Severity: High - local privilege escalation (CVSS 3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, 7.8).
Affected: every release (non-DEBUG) build of com.albert-mueller.opencore-patcher-t2.privileged-helper up to and including the prebuilt binary shipped with this version, whether signed with a Developer ID or a self signed certificate. DEBUG builds (make debug) were never meant to be secure and are unchanged; they still skip the caller check and rely on the command allowlist.

Impact: the helper is installed setuid root and runs any command its caller passes. Any process running as the logged-in user - malware, a malicious script, a compromised app - that got past the caller check could run arbitrary commands as root without an administrator password: modify or replace system files and the sealed system volume, install persistent LaunchDaemons or kernel extensions, read every user's data and disable security features. No user interaction was needed.

1. Caller signature was never validated (CWE-347). The helper compared the certificate lists returned by SecCodeCopySigningInformation() for itself and its parent process, but never called SecStaticCodeCheckValidity() / SecCodeCheckValidity(). Certificates are public and that function does not verify the signature, so a modified copy of OpenCore-Patcher-T2.app, or any binary carrying a copied signature blob, presented the "right" certificates and was accepted.
   Fixed: the helper validates its own signature, then requires the running parent process to satisfy identifier "com.dortania.opencore-legacy-patcher-t2" and certificate leaf = H"<SHA-1 of the helper's own leaf certificate>", checked dynamically (running process) and strictly on disk (all architectures).
2. No identifier pinning (CWE-863). Any binary signed with the same certificate counted as a valid caller, including other tools in the app bundle (e.g. RSRRepair, bundled interpreters/libraries). Any of them that can be made to launch an arbitrary child process became a path to root.
   Fixed: the requirement pins the app's identifier (make CLIENT_ID=... if the bundle identifier is changed).
3. Caller identified by file path, not by the running code (CWE-367). The parent was looked up with proc_pidpath() and its file on disk was inspected, so the code that actually ran was never checked (TOCTOU: the file could differ from what was executing).
   Fixed: the parent is obtained by PID with SecCodeCopyGuestWithAttributes(), validated as running code, and the helper refuses if it was reparented (caller exited) during validation.
4. Hardened runtime not enforced (CWE-693). A caller signed without the hardened runtime was accepted; such a build of the genuine app can be taken over by the same user via DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES or a debugger and made to call the helper.
   Fixed: callers without the hardened runtime are refused with the new error 172 (OCLP_PHT_ERROR_CALLER_NOT_HARDENED, handled like the other permanent signing errors). Note: macOS 10.13 does not enforce the hardened runtime, so this part offers no protection there.
5. Signing key exposed in the login keychain (CWE-522). create-signing-certificate.sh imported the private key into the always-unlocked login keychain and granted /usr/bin/security and codesign access without prompts. With a self signed certificate that key is the helper's only trust root: any process running as the user could sign its own binary (or export the key) and pass the helper's check.
   Fixed: dedicated keychain with its own password, codesign-only access, auto-lock, locked after every build, optional export off the machine. The script refuses to continue while the certificate is still in the login or System keychain until --force replaces it.

• fixes a vulnerability where inside gui_install_oc.py, an attacker could set constants.detected_os to a specially crafted value:

                try:
                      error_dialog = wx.Dialog(self, title="Installation Error", size=(460, 200))
      
                      main_sizer = wx.BoxSizer(wx.VERTICAL)
                      button_sizer = wx.BoxSizer(wx.HORIZONTAL)
      
                      error_msg = "OpenCore installation failed.\n\nWould you like to report this issue or ask Gemini for help?"
                      msg_text = wx.StaticText(error_dialog, label=error_msg)
                      msg_text.SetFont(gui_support.font_factory(12, wx.FONTWEIGHT_NORMAL))
      
                      btn_report = wx.Button(error_dialog, id=wx.ID_OK, label="Report Issue")
                      btn_gemini = wx.Button(error_dialog, id=wx.ID_ANY, label="Ask Gemini")
                      btn_close  = wx.Button(error_dialog, id=wx.ID_CANCEL, label="Close")
      
                      # Define a custom return code identifier for Gemini tracking
                      GEMINI_CLICKED_ID = 10001
      
                      # Bind an event so clicking the button closes the dialog and returns our custom identifier
                      error_dialog.Bind(wx.EVT_BUTTON, lambda event: error_dialog.EndModal(GEMINI_CLICKED_ID), btn_gemini)
      
                      main_sizer.Add(msg_text, 1, wx.ALL | wx.EXPAND, 20)
                      button_sizer.Add(btn_report, 0, wx.RIGHT, 10)
                      button_sizer.Add(btn_gemini, 0, wx.RIGHT, 10)
                      button_sizer.Add(btn_close, 0)
      
                      main_sizer.Add(button_sizer, 0, wx.ALIGN_RIGHT | wx.BOTTOM | wx.RIGHT, 20)
      
                      error_dialog.SetSizer(main_sizer)
                      error_dialog.Layout()
                      error_dialog.Centre()
      
                      response = error_dialog.ShowModal()
      
                      if response == wx.ID_OK:
                          webbrowser.open("https://github.com/albert-mueller/OpenCore-Legacy-Patcher-T2/issues")
      
                      # Check directly for your custom event return hook code
                      # Unter macOS Catalina und älter Gemini funktioniert nicht richtig unter Safari/WebKit
                      elif response == GEMINI_CLICKED_ID:
                          # Gemini can't see the install log on its own, so copy it to the clipboard
                          # and tell the user to paste it in, rather than making them go hunt for
                          # the text box and select/copy it manually.
                          try:
                              clipboard = wx.Clipboard.Get()
                              if not clipboard.IsOpened():
                                  clipboard.Open()
                              clipboard.SetData(wx.TextDataObject(self.text_box.GetValue()))
                              clipboard.Close()
                              wx.MessageDialog(
                                  self,
                                  "The installation log has been copied to your clipboard.\n\nPaste it into the Gemini chat so it can help diagnose the error.",
                                  "Copied to Clipboard",
                                  wx.OK | wx.ICON_INFORMATION
                              ).ShowModal()
                          except Exception as clipboard_error:
                              logging.error(f"Failed to copy installation log to clipboard: {clipboard_error}")
      
                          if self.constants.detected_os >= os_data.os_data.big_sur:
                              logging.info("- Launching Gemini AI Assistant (wx.html2 WebView)")
                              gemini_window = gui_support.GeminiWebView(self, title="Gemini AI Assistant")
                              gemini_window.Show()
                          else: # <- an attacker could set constants.detected_os to a specially crafted value
                              logging.info("- Launching Gemini AI Assistant (default web browser, host predates Big Sur)")
                              logging.info("macOS Catalina, Mojave and High Sierra can't load Gemini in Safari and WebKit because they're too old.")
                              webbrowser.open("https://gemini.google.com")
      
                      error_dialog.Destroy()
  

Impact: an attacker could set constants.detected_os to a specially crafted value to cause an unintended legacy fallback or worse, crash the application to launch a DoS attack. This vulnerability has been fixed by ensuring that Gemini ever opens up if constants.detected_os can be parsed.

• fixes a vulnerability where for the Priveleged Helper Tool the minimum requirements are OS X Mavericks, while the patcher requires minimum macOS High Sierra. This creates a ...