Security Policy

Supported Versions

Security fixes target the latest released version of ADR Toolkit.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting form at https://github.com/SHcommit/ADR-toolkit/security/advisories/new instead of opening a public issue. Include:

• affected version or commit
• reproduction steps
• expected impact
• whether the issue affects generated ADR content, command execution, path handling, release automation, or plugin installation

Do not include exploit details in a public issue until a fix or mitigation is available.

Verifying a Release

Every v* release is built by .github/workflows/release.yml from a tagged commit, and the workflow publishes a GitHub Artifact Attestation for the packaged skill archive it attaches to the release (adr-toolkit-skill-vX.Y.Z.tar.gz). This is a Sigstore-backed, keyless signature -- no private key is held or rotated by this project -- proving the archive was produced by this repository's own CI, from the exact commit the release tag points to.

The repository has been public since 2026-08-29, so current releases are eligible for attestation. The workflow keeps a private-repository guard only so forks or future visibility changes fail safely; check a given release's assets to confirm that its attestation was actually published.

To verify a downloaded archive:

# Checksum: confirms the file wasn't corrupted/tampered with in transit
sha256sum -c adr-toolkit-skill-vX.Y.Z.tar.gz.sha256

# Provenance: confirms the archive was actually built by this repo's CI,
# not a look-alike release from a compromised account or a different repo.
gh attestation verify adr-toolkit-skill-vX.Y.Z.tar.gz -R SHcommit/ADR-toolkit

Anyone consuming this repository directly (git clone, or an adapter's marketplace add/plugin add pointing at the repo, which is how every adapter installs this skill today) is verifying via Git/GitHub's own commit and tag history rather than this archive -- the attestation is primarily for the one path where a bare checkout doesn't happen: someone who downloads the release archive off the GitHub Releases page directly.

Scope

In scope:

• command injection or unsafe path handling in deterministic scripts
• release workflow or version provenance problems
• plugin manifest behavior that can install or expose unintended files
• validation bugs that silently report clean results for invalid ADR state

Out of scope:

• disagreement with an ADR's architectural recommendation
• AI-generated prose quality
• unsupported third-party harness behavior outside this repository's adapters