- Home
-
CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Weakness ID: 862Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review (with careful review of mapping notes)
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.View customized information:For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.×
Edit Custom Filter
AuthZ "AuthZ" is typically used as an abbreviation of "authorization" within the web application security community. It is distinct from "AuthN" (or, sometimes, "AuthC") which is an abbreviation of "authentication." The use of "Auth" as an abbreviation is discouraged, since it could be used for either authentication or authorization.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
Impact Details Read Application Data; Read Files or Directories
Scope: Confidentiality An attacker could read sensitive data, either by reading the data directly from a data store that is not restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to read the data.Modify Application Data; Modify Files or Directories
Scope: Integrity An attacker could modify sensitive data, either by writing the data directly to a data store that is not restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to write the data.Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism
Scope: Access Control An attacker could gain privileges by modifying or reading critical data directly, or by accessing privileged functionality.DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory); DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)
Scope: Availability An attacker could gain unauthorized access to resources on the system and excessively consume those resources, leading to a denial of service.Phase(s) Mitigation Architecture and Design
Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Architecture and Design
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Architecture and Design
For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
System Configuration; Installation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name ChildOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
285 Improper Authorization ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
425 Direct Request ('Forced Browsing') ParentOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
638 Not Using Complete Mediation ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
939 Improper Authorization in Handler for Custom URL Scheme ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1314 Missing Write Protection for Parametric Data Values
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).
1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
425 Direct Request ('Forced Browsing')
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
1011 Authorize Actors
Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
Nature Type ID Name ChildOf
Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
284 Improper Access Control An access control list (ACL) represents who/what has permissions to a given object. Different operating systems implement (ACLs) in different ways. In UNIX, there are three types of permissions: read, write, and execute. Users are divided into three classes for file access: owner, group owner, and all other users where each class has a separate set of rights. In Windows NT, there are four basic types of permissions for files: "No access", "Read access", "Change access", and "Full control". Windows NT extends the concept of three types of users in UNIX to include a list of users and groups along with their associated permissions. A user can create an object (file) and assign specified permissions to that object.
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
Phase Note Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
Implementation A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies. Operation
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Languages Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Technologies AI/ML (Undetermined Prevalence)
Web Server (Often Prevalent)
Database Server (Often Prevalent)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
This function runs an arbitrary SQL query on a given database, returning the result of the query.
(bad code)Example Language: PHPfunction runEmployeeQuery($dbName, $name){mysql_select_db($dbName,$globalDbHandle) or die("Could not open Database".$dbName);}
//Use a prepared statement to avoid CWE-89
$preparedStatement = $globalDbHandle->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$preparedStatement->execute(array(':name' => $name));
return $preparedStatement->fetchAll();
/.../
$employeeRecord = runEmployeeQuery('EmployeeDB',$_GET['EmployeeName']);While this code is careful to avoid SQL Injection, the function does not confirm the user sending the query is authorized to do so. An attacker may be able to obtain sensitive employee information from the database.
Example 2
The following program could be part of a bulletin board system that allows users to send private messages to each other. This program intends to authenticate the user before deciding whether a private message should be displayed. Assume that LookupMessageObject() ensures that the $id argument is numeric, constructs a filename based on that id, and reads the message details from that file. Also assume that the program stores all private messages for all users in the same directory.
(bad code)Example Language: Perlsub DisplayPrivateMessage {my($id) = @_;}
my $Message = LookupMessageObject($id);
print "From: " . encodeHTML($Message->{from}) . "<br>\n";
print "Subject: " . encodeHTML($Message->{subject}) . "\n";
print "<hr>\n";
print "Body: " . encodeHTML($Message->{body}) . "\n";
my $q = new CGI;
# For purposes of this example, assume that CWE-309 and
# CWE-523 do not apply.
if (! AuthenticateUser($q->param('username'), $q->param('password'))) {ExitError("invalid username or password");}
my $id = $q->param('id');
DisplayPrivateMessage($id);While the program properly exits if authentication fails, it does not ensure that the message is addressed to the user. As a result, an authenticated attacker could provide any arbitrary identifier and read private messages that were intended for other users.
One way to avoid this problem would be to ensure that the "to" field in the message object matches the username of the authenticated user.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
Reference Description chatbot Wordpress plugin does not perform authorization on a REST endpoint, allowing retrieval of an API keyAI-enabled WordPress plugin has a missing capability check for a particular function, allowing changing public status of postsGo-based continuous deployment product does not check that a user has certain privileges to update or create an app, allowing adversaries to read sensitive repository informationWeb application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to reset administrative passwords.Web application stores database file under the web root with insufficient access control (CWE-219), allowing direct request.Terminal server does not check authorization for guest access.System monitoring software allows users to bypass authorization by creating custom forms.Content management system does not check access permissions for private files, allowing others to view those files.Product does not check the ACL of a page accessed using an "include" directive, allowing attackers to read unauthorized files.Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to modify passwords of other users.Database server does not use appropriate privileges for certain sensitive operations.Gateway uses default "Allow" configuration for its authorization settings.Chain: product does not properly interpret a configuration option for a system group, allowing users to gain privileges.Chain: SNMP product does not properly parse a configuration option for which hosts are allowed to connect, allowing unauthorized IP addresses to connect.Chain: reliance on client-side security (CWE-602) allows attackers to bypass authorization using a custom client.Chain: product does not properly handle wildcards in an authorization policy list, allowing unintended access.ACL-based protection mechanism treats negative access rights as if they are positive, allowing bypass of intended restrictions.Default ACL list for a DNS server does not set certain ACLs, allowing unauthorized DNS queries.Product relies on the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header for authorization, allowing unintended access by spoofing the header.OS kernel does not check for a certain privilege before setting ACLs for files.Chain: file-system code performs an incorrect comparison (CWE-697), preventing default ACLs from being properly applied.Chain: product does not properly check the result of a reverse DNS lookup because of operator precedence (CWE-783), allowing bypass of DNS-based access restrictions.Ordinality Description Primary(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)Method Details Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note:These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Web Application Scanner
- Web Services Scanner
- Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Host Application Interface Scanner
- Fuzz Tester
- Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
- Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Source code Weakness Analyzer
- Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:- Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
- Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.813 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A4 - Insecure Direct Object References MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.817 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A8 - Failure to Restrict URL Access MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.866 2011 Top 25 - Porous Defenses MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).884 CWE Cross-section MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1345 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A01:2021 - Broken Access Control MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1436 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A01:2025 - Broken Access Control Usage ALLOWED-WITH-REVIEW (this CWE ID could be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities in limited situations requiring careful review)Reason Abstraction Rationale
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate Comments
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-1 Req 4.3.3.7 ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 2.1 ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 2.1 CAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name CAPEC-665 Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws [REF-229] NIST. "Role Based Access Control and Role Based Security".
<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/role-based-access-control>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 4, "Authorization" Page 114; Chapter 6, "Determining Appropriate Access Control" Page 171. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.[REF-231] Frank Kim. "Top 25 Series - Rank 5 - Improper Access Control (Authorization)". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-04.
<https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-5-improper-access-control-authorization>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<https://owasp.org/www-project-enterprise-security-api/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)[REF-233] Rahul Bhattacharjee. "Authentication using JAAS".
<https://javaranch.com/journal/2008/04/authentication-using-JAAS.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Authorization", Page 39. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006. [REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)More information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter.Page Last Updated: January 21, 2026Use of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) and the associated references from this website are subject to the Terms of Use. CWE is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and managed by the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) which is operated by The MITRE Corporation (MITRE). Copyright © 2006–2026, The MITRE Corporation. CWE, CWSS, CWRAF, and the CWE logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.



