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CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
Weakness ID: 20Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.View customized information:For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.×
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Input validation is a frequently-used technique for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the code, or when communicating with other components.
Input can consist of:
- raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
- metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data can be composed of many nested layers, composed of combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need to be validated upon entry into the code, such as:
- specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
- implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
- indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
- symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
- well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
- lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
- specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
- consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
- conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
- equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
- authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor to improper input validation.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
Impact Details DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)
Scope: Availability An attacker could provide unexpected values and cause a program crash or arbitrary control of resource allocation, leading to excessive consumption of resources such as memory and CPU.Read Memory; Read Files or Directories
Scope: Confidentiality An attacker could read confidential data if they are able to control resource references.Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability An attacker could use malicious input to modify data or possibly alter control flow in unexpected ways, including arbitrary command execution.Phase(s) Mitigation Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name ChildOf
Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
707 Improper Neutralization ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
179 Incorrect Behavior Order: Early Validation ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
622 Improper Validation of Function Hook Arguments ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1173 Improper Use of Validation Framework ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1285 Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1286 Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1287 Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1288 Improper Validation of Consistency within Input ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1289 Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input PeerOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity CanPrecede
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') CanPrecede
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
41 Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence CanPrecede
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') CanPrecede
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer CanPrecede
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).
1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
129 Improper Validation of Array Index ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
1019 Validate Inputs
Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
Nature Type ID Name ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
15 External Control of System or Configuration Setting ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
73 External Control of File Name or Path ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
102 Struts: Duplicate Validation Forms ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
103 Struts: Incomplete validate() Method Definition ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
104 Struts: Form Bean Does Not Extend Validation Class ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
105 Struts: Form Field Without Validator ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
106 Struts: Plug-in Framework not in Use ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
107 Struts: Unused Validation Form ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
108 Struts: Unvalidated Action Form ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
109 Struts: Validator Turned Off ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
110 Struts: Validator Without Form Field ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
111 Direct Use of Unsafe JNI ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
112 Missing XML Validation ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
113 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') ParentOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
114 Process Control ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
117 Improper Output Neutralization for Logs ParentOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
170 Improper Null Termination ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
466 Return of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection') ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
785 Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
Phase Note Architecture and Design Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
If a programmer believes that an attacker cannot modify certain inputs, then the programmer might not perform any input validation at all. For example, in web applications, many programmers believe that cookies and hidden form fields can not be modified from a web browser (CWE-472), although they can be altered using a proxy or a custom program. In a client-server architecture, the programmer might assume that client-side security checks cannot be bypassed, even when a custom client could be written that skips those checks (CWE-602).
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Languages Class: Not Language-Specific (Often Prevalent)
Example 1
This example demonstrates a shopping interaction in which the user is free to specify the quantity of items to be purchased and a total is calculated.
(bad code)Example Language: Java...
public static final double price = 20.00;
int quantity = currentUser.getAttribute("quantity");
double total = price * quantity;
chargeUser(total);
...The user has no control over the price variable, however the code does not prevent a negative value from being specified for quantity. If an attacker were to provide a negative value, then the user would have their account credited instead of debited.
Example 2
This example asks the user for a height and width of an m X n game board with a maximum dimension of 100 squares.
(bad code)Example Language: C...
#define MAX_DIM 100
...
/* board dimensions */
int m,n, error;
board_square_t *board;
printf("Please specify the board height: \n");
error = scanf("%d", &m);
if ( EOF == error ){die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");}
printf("Please specify the board width: \n");
error = scanf("%d", &n);
if ( EOF == error ){die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");}
if ( m > MAX_DIM || n > MAX_DIM ) {die("Value too large: Die evil hacker!\n");}
board = (board_square_t*) malloc( m * n * sizeof(board_square_t));
...While this code checks to make sure the user cannot specify large, positive integers and consume too much memory, it does not check for negative values supplied by the user. As a result, an attacker can perform a resource consumption (CWE-400) attack against this program by specifying two, large negative values that will not overflow, resulting in a very large memory allocation (CWE-789) and possibly a system crash. Alternatively, an attacker can provide very large negative values which will cause an integer overflow (CWE-190) and unexpected behavior will follow depending on how the values are treated in the remainder of the program.
Example 3
The following example shows a PHP application in which the programmer attempts to display a user's birthday and homepage.
(bad code)Example Language: PHP$birthday = $_GET['birthday'];
$homepage = $_GET['homepage'];
echo "Birthday: $birthday<br>Homepage: <a href=$homepage>click here</a>"The programmer intended for $birthday to be in a date format and $homepage to be a valid URL. However, since the values are derived from an HTTP request, if an attacker can trick a victim into clicking a crafted URL with <script> tags providing the values for birthday and / or homepage, then the script will run on the client's browser when the web server echoes the content. Notice that even if the programmer were to defend the $birthday variable by restricting input to integers and dashes, it would still be possible for an attacker to provide a string of the form:
(attack code)2009-01-09--If this data were used in a SQL statement, it would treat the remainder of the statement as a comment. The comment could disable other security-related logic in the statement. In this case, encoding combined with input validation would be a more useful protection mechanism.
Furthermore, an XSS (CWE-79) attack or SQL injection (CWE-89) are just a few of the potential consequences when input validation is not used. Depending on the context of the code, CRLF Injection (CWE-93), Argument Injection (CWE-88), or Command Injection (CWE-77) may also be possible.
Example 4
The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.
(bad code)Example Language: Javaprivate void buildList ( int untrustedListSize ){if ( 0 > untrustedListSize ){}die("Negative value supplied for list size, die evil hacker!");}
Widget[] list = new Widget [ untrustedListSize ];
list[0] = new Widget();This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.
Example 5
This Android application has registered to handle a URL when sent an intent:
(bad code)Example Language: Java
...
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.URLHandler.openURL");
MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();
registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
...
public class UrlHandlerReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {}@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {}if("com.example.URLHandler.openURL".equals(intent.getAction())) {String URL = intent.getStringExtra("URLToOpen");
int length = URL.length();
...
}The application assumes the URL will always be included in the intent. When the URL is not present, the call to getStringExtra() will return null, thus causing a null pointer exception when length() is called.
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
Reference Description Improper input validation of HTTP requests in IP phone, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.Eval injection in Perl program using an ID that should only contain hyphens and numbers.SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.lack of input validation in spreadsheet program leads to buffer overflows, integer overflows, array index errors, and memory corruption.insufficient validation enables XSSdriver in security product allows code execution due to insufficient validationinfinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itselfinfinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itselfmissing parameter leads to crashHTTP request with missing protocol version number leads to crashrequest with missing parameters leads to information exposuresystem crash with offset value that is inconsistent with packet sizesize field that is inconsistent with packet size leads to buffer over-readproduct uses a denylist to identify potentially dangerous content, allowing attacker to bypass a warningsecurity bypass via an extra headerempty packet triggers rebootincomplete denylist allows SQL injectionNUL byte in theme name causes directory traversal impact to be worsekernel does not validate an incoming pointer before dereferencing itanti-virus product has insufficient input validation of hooked SSDT functions, allowing code executionanti-virus product allows DoS via zero-length fielddriver does not validate input from userland to the kernelkernel does not validate parameters sent in from userland, allowing code executionlack of validation of string length fields allows memory consumption or buffer over-readlack of validation of length field leads to infinite looplack of validation of input to an IOCTL allows code executionzero-length attachment causes crashzero-length input causes free of uninitialized pointercrash via a malformed frame structureinfinite loop from a long SMTP requestrouter crashes with a malformed packetpacket with invalid version number leads to NULL pointer dereferencecrash via multiple "." characters in file extensionOrdinality Description Primary(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)Method Details Automated Static Analysis
Some instances of improper input validation can be detected using automated static analysis.
A static analysis tool might allow the user to specify which application-specific methods or functions perform input validation; the tool might also have built-in knowledge of validation frameworks such as Struts. The tool may then suppress or de-prioritize any associated warnings. This allows the analyst to focus on areas of the software in which input validation does not appear to be present.
Except in the cases described in the previous paragraph, automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or require any code changes.
Manual Static Analysis
When custom input validation is required, such as when enforcing business rules, manual analysis is necessary to ensure that the validation is properly implemented.Fuzzing
Fuzzing techniques can be useful for detecting input validation errors. When unexpected inputs are provided to the software, the software should not crash or otherwise become unstable, and it should generate application-controlled error messages. If exceptions or interpreter-generated error messages occur, this indicates that the input was not detected and handled within the application logic itself.Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
- Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:- Web Application Scanner
- Web Services Scanner
- Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:- Fuzz Tester
- Framework-based Fuzzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Host Application Interface Scanner
- Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:- Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
- Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:- Source code Weakness Analyzer
- Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:- Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
- Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:- Attack Modeling
Effectiveness: High
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016 MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.722 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT) MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM) MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.746 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 13 - Error Handling (ERR) MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC) MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT) MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM) MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC) MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.994 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Variable MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1005 7PK - Input Validation and Representation MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1163 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 09. Input Output (FIO) MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1347 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1406 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Input Validation MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1440 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A05:2025 - Injection Usage DISCOURAGED (this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)Reasons Frequent Misuse, Frequent Misinterpretation, Abstraction Rationale
CWE-20 is commonly misused in low-information vulnerability reports when lower-level CWEs could be used instead, or when more details about the vulnerability are available [REF-1287]. It is not useful for trend analysis. It is also a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). Finally, it is often used when the root cause issue is related to how input is incorrectly transformed, instead of "validated" to be correct as-is. Comments
Within CWE, the "input validation" term focuses on the act of checking whether an input is already safe, which is different from other techniques that ensure safe processing of input. Carefully perform root-cause analysis to be sure that the issue is not due to techniques that attempt to transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component. If the issue is truly due to imroper input validation, consider using lower-level children such as Improper Use of Validation Framework (CWE-1173) or improper validation involving specific types or properties of input such as Specified Quantity (CWE-1284); Specified Index, Position, or Offset (CWE-1285); Syntactic Correctness (CWE-1286); Specified Type (CWE-1287); Consistency within Input (CWE-1288); or Unsafe Equivalence (CWE-1289). Suggestions
CWE-ID Comment CWE-1284 Specified Quantity CWE-1285 Specified Index, Position, or Offset CWE-1286 Syntactic Correctness CWE-1287 Specified Type CWE-1288 Consistency within Input CWE-1289 Unsafe Equivalence CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output CWE-790 Improper Filtering of Special Elements Relationship
CWE-116 and CWE-20 have a close association because, depending on the nature of the structured message, proper input validation can indirectly prevent special characters from changing the meaning of a structured message. For example, by validating that a numeric ID field should only contain the 0-9 characters, the programmer effectively prevents injection attacks.
Multiple techniques exist to transform potentially dangerous input into something safe, which is different than "validation," which is a technique to check if an input is already safe. CWE users need to be cautious during root cause analysis to ensure that an issue is truly an input-validation problem.
Terminology
The "input validation" term is extremely common, but it is used in many different ways. In some cases its usage can obscure the real underlying weakness or otherwise hide chaining and composite relationships.
Some people use "input validation" as a general term that covers many different neutralization techniques for ensuring that input is appropriate, such as filtering, i.e., attempting to remove dangerous inputs (related to CWE-790); encoding/escaping, i.e., attempting to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component (related to CWE-116); or canonicalization, which often indirectly removes otherwise-dangerous inputs. Others use the term in a narrower context to simply mean "checking if an input conforms to expectations without changing it." CWE uses this narrow interpretation.
Note that "input validation" has very different meanings to different people, or within different classification schemes. Caution must be used when referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example, some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control to an attacker over an input when they should not be able to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the distinctions between input validation and output escaping are often blurred. Developers must be careful to understand the difference, including how input validation is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities, especially when less stringent data types must be supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step since it is a common last name in the English language. However, this valid name cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
Maintenance
As of 2020, this entry is used more often than preferred, and it is a source of frequent confusion. It is being actively modified for CWE 4.1 and subsequent versions.Maintenance
Maintenance
Input validation - whether missing or incorrect - is such an essential and widespread part of secure development that it is implicit in many different weaknesses. Traditionally, problems such as buffer overflows and XSS have been classified as input validation problems by many security professionals. However, input validation is not necessarily the only protection mechanism available for avoiding such problems, and in some cases it is not even sufficient. The CWE team has begun capturing these subtleties in chains within the Research Concepts view (CWE-1000), but more work is needed.Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name 7 Pernicious Kingdoms Input validation and representation OWASP Top Ten 2004 A1 CWE More Specific Unvalidated Input CERT C Secure Coding ERR07-C Prefer functions that support error checking over equivalent functions that don't CERT C Secure Coding FIO30-C CWE More Abstract Exclude user input from format strings CERT C Secure Coding MEM10-C Define and use a pointer validation function WASC 20 Improper Input Handling Software Fault Patterns SFP25 Tainted input to variable CAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name CAPEC-10 Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables CAPEC-101 Server Side Include (SSI) Injection CAPEC-104 Cross Zone Scripting CAPEC-108 Command Line Execution through SQL Injection CAPEC-109 Object Relational Mapping Injection CAPEC-110 SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering CAPEC-120 Double Encoding CAPEC-13 Subverting Environment Variable Values CAPEC-135 Format String Injection CAPEC-136 LDAP Injection CAPEC-14 Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow CAPEC-153 Input Data Manipulation CAPEC-182 Flash Injection CAPEC-209 XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch CAPEC-22 Exploiting Trust in Client CAPEC-23 File Content Injection CAPEC-230 Serialized Data with Nested Payloads CAPEC-231 Oversized Serialized Data Payloads CAPEC-24 Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow CAPEC-250 XML Injection CAPEC-261 Fuzzing for garnering other adjacent user/sensitive data CAPEC-267 Leverage Alternate Encoding CAPEC-28 Fuzzing CAPEC-3 Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters CAPEC-31 Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies CAPEC-42 MIME Conversion CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers CAPEC-45 Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links CAPEC-46 Overflow Variables and Tags CAPEC-47 Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion CAPEC-473 Signature Spoof CAPEC-52 Embedding NULL Bytes CAPEC-53 Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash CAPEC-588 DOM-Based XSS CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) CAPEC-64 Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-664 Server Side Request Forgery CAPEC-67 String Format Overflow in syslog() CAPEC-7 Blind SQL Injection CAPEC-71 Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-72 URL Encoding CAPEC-73 User-Controlled Filename CAPEC-78 Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-79 Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-8 Buffer Overflow in an API Call CAPEC-80 Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-81 Web Server Logs Tampering CAPEC-83 XPath Injection CAPEC-85 AJAX Footprinting CAPEC-88 OS Command Injection CAPEC-9 Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities [REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
<https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.[REF-166] Jim Manico. "Input Validation with ESAPI - Very Important". 2008-08-15.
<https://manicode.blogspot.com/2008/08/input-validation-with-esapi.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)[REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
<https://owasp.org/www-project-enterprise-security-api/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)[REF-168] Joel Scambray, Mike Shema and Caleb Sima. "Hacking Exposed Web Applications, Second Edition". Input Validation Attacks. McGraw-Hill. 2006-06-05. [REF-48] Jeremiah Grossman. "Input validation or output filtering, which is better?". 2007-01-30.
<https://blog.jeremiahgrossman.com/2007/01/input-validation-or-output-filtering.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)[REF-170] Kevin Beaver. "The importance of input validation". 2006-09-06.
<http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid92_gci1214373,00.html>.[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 10, "All Input Is Evil!" Page 341. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.[REF-1109] "LANGSEC: Language-theoretic Security".
<http://langsec.org/>.[REF-1110] "LangSec: Recognition, Validation, and Compositional Correctness for Real World Security".
<http://langsec.org/bof-handout.pdf>.[REF-1111] Sergey Bratus, Lars Hermerschmidt, Sven M. Hallberg, Michael E. Locasto, Falcon D. Momot, Meredith L. Patterson and Anna Shubina. "Curing the Vulnerable Parser: Design Patterns for Secure Input Handling". USENIX ;login:. 2017.
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/login_spring17_08_bratus.pdf>.[REF-1287] MITRE. "Supplemental Details - 2022 CWE Top 25". Details of Problematic Mappings. 2022-06-28.
<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25_supplemental.html#problematicMappingDetails>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)[REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)More information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter.Page Last Updated: January 21, 2026Use of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) and the associated references from this website are subject to the Terms of Use. CWE is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and managed by the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) which is operated by The MITRE Corporation (MITRE). Copyright © 2006–2026, The MITRE Corporation. CWE, CWSS, CWRAF, and the CWE logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.



