CWE - CWE-20: Improper Input Validation (4.19.1)
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  • CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

    Weakness ID: 20
    Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
    Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
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    + Description
    The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. Diagram for CWE-20
    + Extended Description

    Input validation is a frequently-used technique for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the code, or when communicating with other components.

    Input can consist of:

    • raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
    • metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size

    Data can be simple or structured. Structured data can be composed of many nested layers, composed of combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or structured data.

    Many properties of raw data or metadata may need to be validated upon entry into the code, such as:

    • specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
    • implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
    • indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
    • symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
    • well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
    • lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
    • specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
    • consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
    • conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
    • equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
    • authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data

    Implied or derived properties of data must often be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor to improper input validation.

    + Common Consequences
    Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
    Impact Details

    DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU); DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)

    Scope: Availability

    An attacker could provide unexpected values and cause a program crash or arbitrary control of resource allocation, leading to excessive consumption of resources such as memory and CPU.

    Read Memory; Read Files or Directories

    Scope: Confidentiality

    An attacker could read confidential data if they are able to control resource references.

    Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

    Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability

    An attacker could use malicious input to modify data or possibly alter control flow in unexpected ways, including arbitrary command execution.
    + Potential Mitigations
    Phase(s) Mitigation

    Architecture and Design

    Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

    Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]

    Architecture and Design

    Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

    Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).

    Architecture and Design; Implementation

    Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

    Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

    Implementation

    Strategy: Input Validation

    Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

    When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."

    Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

    Effectiveness: High

    Architecture and Design

    For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

    Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

    Implementation

    When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.

    Implementation

    Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.

    Implementation

    Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.

    Implementation

    Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.

    Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.

    Implementation

    When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
    + Relationships
    Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
    + Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 707 Improper Neutralization
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 179 Incorrect Behavior Order: Early Validation
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 622 Improper Validation of Function Hook Arguments
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1173 Improper Use of Validation Framework
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1285 Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1286 Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1287 Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1288 Improper Validation of Consistency within Input
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1289 Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input
    PeerOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
    CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
    CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 41 Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence
    CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
    CanPrecede Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
    CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
    + Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 129 Improper Validation of Array Index
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
    + Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1019 Validate Inputs
    + Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (View-700)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 15 External Control of System or Configuration Setting
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 73 External Control of File Name or Path
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 102 Struts: Duplicate Validation Forms
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 103 Struts: Incomplete validate() Method Definition
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 104 Struts: Form Bean Does Not Extend Validation Class
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 105 Struts: Form Field Without Validator
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 106 Struts: Plug-in Framework not in Use
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 107 Struts: Unused Validation Form
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 108 Struts: Unvalidated Action Form
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 109 Struts: Validator Turned Off
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 110 Struts: Validator Without Form Field
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 111 Direct Use of Unsafe JNI
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 112 Missing XML Validation
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 113 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')
    ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 114 Process Control
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 117 Improper Output Neutralization for Logs
    ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 170 Improper Null Termination
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 466 Return of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range
    ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
    ParentOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 785 Use of Path Manipulation Function without Maximum-sized Buffer
    + Modes Of Introduction
    Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
    Phase Note
    Architecture and Design
    Implementation

    REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

    If a programmer believes that an attacker cannot modify certain inputs, then the programmer might not perform any input validation at all. For example, in web applications, many programmers believe that cookies and hidden form fields can not be modified from a web browser (CWE-472), although they can be altered using a proxy or a custom program. In a client-server architecture, the programmer might assume that client-side security checks cannot be bypassed, even when a custom client could be written that skips those checks (CWE-602).

    + Applicable Platforms
    Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
    Languages

    Class: Not Language-Specific (Often Prevalent)

    + Likelihood Of Exploit
    High
    + Demonstrative Examples

    Example 1


    This example demonstrates a shopping interaction in which the user is free to specify the quantity of items to be purchased and a total is calculated.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: Java 
    ...
    public static final double price = 20.00;
    int quantity = currentUser.getAttribute("quantity");
    double total = price * quantity;
    chargeUser(total);
    ...

    The user has no control over the price variable, however the code does not prevent a negative value from being specified for quantity. If an attacker were to provide a negative value, then the user would have their account credited instead of debited.



    Example 2


    This example asks the user for a height and width of an m X n game board with a maximum dimension of 100 squares.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: C 
    ...
    #define MAX_DIM 100
    ...
    /* board dimensions */

    int m,n, error;
    board_square_t *board;
    printf("Please specify the board height: \n");
    error = scanf("%d", &m);
    if ( EOF == error ){
    die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");
    }
    printf("Please specify the board width: \n");
    error = scanf("%d", &n);
    if ( EOF == error ){
    die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");
    }
    if ( m > MAX_DIM || n > MAX_DIM ) {
    die("Value too large: Die evil hacker!\n");
    }
    board = (board_square_t*) malloc( m * n * sizeof(board_square_t));
    ...

    While this code checks to make sure the user cannot specify large, positive integers and consume too much memory, it does not check for negative values supplied by the user. As a result, an attacker can perform a resource consumption (CWE-400) attack against this program by specifying two, large negative values that will not overflow, resulting in a very large memory allocation (CWE-789) and possibly a system crash. Alternatively, an attacker can provide very large negative values which will cause an integer overflow (CWE-190) and unexpected behavior will follow depending on how the values are treated in the remainder of the program.



    Example 3


    The following example shows a PHP application in which the programmer attempts to display a user's birthday and homepage.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: PHP 
    $birthday = $_GET['birthday'];
    $homepage = $_GET['homepage'];
    echo "Birthday: $birthday<br>Homepage: <a href=$homepage>click here</a>"

    The programmer intended for $birthday to be in a date format and $homepage to be a valid URL. However, since the values are derived from an HTTP request, if an attacker can trick a victim into clicking a crafted URL with <script> tags providing the values for birthday and / or homepage, then the script will run on the client's browser when the web server echoes the content. Notice that even if the programmer were to defend the $birthday variable by restricting input to integers and dashes, it would still be possible for an attacker to provide a string of the form:

    (attack code)
    2009-01-09--

    If this data were used in a SQL statement, it would treat the remainder of the statement as a comment. The comment could disable other security-related logic in the statement. In this case, encoding combined with input validation would be a more useful protection mechanism.

    Furthermore, an XSS (CWE-79) attack or SQL injection (CWE-89) are just a few of the potential consequences when input validation is not used. Depending on the context of the code, CRLF Injection (CWE-93), Argument Injection (CWE-88), or Command Injection (CWE-77) may also be possible.



    Example 4


    The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: Java 
    private void buildList ( int untrustedListSize ){
    if ( 0 > untrustedListSize ){
    die("Negative value supplied for list size, die evil hacker!");
    }
    Widget[] list = new Widget [ untrustedListSize ];
    list[0] = new Widget();
    }

    This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.



    Example 5


    This Android application has registered to handle a URL when sent an intent:

    (bad code)
    Example Language: Java 

    ...
    IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.URLHandler.openURL");
    MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();
    registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
    ...

    public class UrlHandlerReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
    @Override
    public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
    if("com.example.URLHandler.openURL".equals(intent.getAction())) {
    String URL = intent.getStringExtra("URLToOpen");
    int length = URL.length();

    ...
    }
    }
    }

    The application assumes the URL will always be included in the intent. When the URL is not present, the call to getStringExtra() will return null, thus causing a null pointer exception when length() is called.



    + Selected Observed Examples

    Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

    Reference Description
    Large language model (LLM) management tool does not validate the format of a digest value (CWE-1287) from a private, untrusted model registry, enabling relative path traversal (CWE-23), a.k.a. Probllama
    Chain: a learning management tool debugger uses external input to locate previous session logs (CWE-73) and does not properly validate the given path (CWE-20), allowing for filesystem path traversal using "../" sequences (CWE-24)
    Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190) in mobile OS, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
    Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190) in mobile OS, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
    Chain: backslash followed by a newline can bypass a validation step (CWE-20), leading to eval injection (CWE-95), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
    Chain: insufficient input validation (CWE-20) in browser allows heap corruption (CWE-787), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
    Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in username parameter, leading to OS command injection (CWE-78), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
    Chain: security product has improper input validation (CWE-20) leading to directory traversal (CWE-22), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
    Improper input validation of HTTP requests in IP phone, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
    Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in firewall product leads to XSS (CWE-79), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
    Chain: caching proxy server has improper input validation (CWE-20) of headers, allowing HTTP response smuggling (CWE-444) using an "LF line ending"
    Eval injection in Perl program using an ID that should only contain hyphens and numbers.
    SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.
    lack of input validation in spreadsheet program leads to buffer overflows, integer overflows, array index errors, and memory corruption.
    insufficient validation enables XSS
    driver in security product allows code execution due to insufficient validation
    infinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itself
    infinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itself
    missing parameter leads to crash
    HTTP request with missing protocol version number leads to crash
    request with missing parameters leads to information exposure
    system crash with offset value that is inconsistent with packet size
    size field that is inconsistent with packet size leads to buffer over-read
    product uses a denylist to identify potentially dangerous content, allowing attacker to bypass a warning
    security bypass via an extra header
    empty packet triggers reboot
    incomplete denylist allows SQL injection
    NUL byte in theme name causes directory traversal impact to be worse
    kernel does not validate an incoming pointer before dereferencing it
    anti-virus product has insufficient input validation of hooked SSDT functions, allowing code execution
    anti-virus product allows DoS via zero-length field
    driver does not validate input from userland to the kernel
    kernel does not validate parameters sent in from userland, allowing code execution
    lack of validation of string length fields allows memory consumption or buffer over-read
    lack of validation of length field leads to infinite loop
    lack of validation of input to an IOCTL allows code execution
    zero-length attachment causes crash
    zero-length input causes free of uninitialized pointer
    crash via a malformed frame structure
    infinite loop from a long SMTP request
    router crashes with a malformed packet
    packet with invalid version number leads to NULL pointer dereference
    crash via multiple "." characters in file extension
    + Weakness Ordinalities
    Ordinality Description
    Primary
    (where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
    + Detection Methods
    Method Details

    Automated Static Analysis

    Some instances of improper input validation can be detected using automated static analysis.

    A static analysis tool might allow the user to specify which application-specific methods or functions perform input validation; the tool might also have built-in knowledge of validation frameworks such as Struts. The tool may then suppress or de-prioritize any associated warnings. This allows the analyst to focus on areas of the software in which input validation does not appear to be present.

    Except in the cases described in the previous paragraph, automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or require any code changes.

    Manual Static Analysis

    When custom input validation is required, such as when enforcing business rules, manual analysis is necessary to ensure that the validation is properly implemented.

    Fuzzing

    Fuzzing techniques can be useful for detecting input validation errors. When unexpected inputs are provided to the software, the software should not crash or otherwise become unstable, and it should generate application-controlled error messages. If exceptions or interpreter-generated error messages occur, this indicates that the input was not detected and handled within the application logic itself.

    Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Cost effective for partial coverage:
    • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
    • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

    Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

    Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Cost effective for partial coverage:
    • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

    Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

    Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Highly cost effective:
    • Web Application Scanner
    • Web Services Scanner
    • Database Scanners

    Effectiveness: High

    Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Highly cost effective:
    • Fuzz Tester
    • Framework-based Fuzzer
    Cost effective for partial coverage:
    • Host Application Interface Scanner
    • Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

    Effectiveness: High

    Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Highly cost effective:
    • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
    • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

    Effectiveness: High

    Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Highly cost effective:
    • Source code Weakness Analyzer
    • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

    Effectiveness: High

    Architecture or Design Review

    According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

    Highly cost effective:
    • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
    • Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
    Cost effective for partial coverage:
    • Attack Modeling

    Effectiveness: High

    + Memberships
    Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 635 Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 722 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 738 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 5 - Integers (INT)
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 742 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 9 - Memory Management (MEM)
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 746 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 13 - Error Handling (ERR)
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 751 2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 872 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 04 - Integers (INT)
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 876 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 08 - Memory Management (MEM)
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 994 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Variable
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1005 7PK - Input Validation and Representation
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1163 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 09. Input Output (FIO)
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1200 Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1337 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1347 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1350 Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1382 ICS Operations (& Maintenance): Emerging Energy Technologies
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1387 Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1406 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Input Validation
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1425 Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1430 Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1435 Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1440 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A05:2025 - Injection
    + Vulnerability Mapping Notes
    Usage DISCOURAGED
    (this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
    Reasons Frequent Misuse, Frequent Misinterpretation, Abstraction

    Rationale

    CWE-20 is commonly misused in low-information vulnerability reports when lower-level CWEs could be used instead, or when more details about the vulnerability are available [REF-1287]. It is not useful for trend analysis. It is also a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). Finally, it is often used when the root cause issue is related to how input is incorrectly transformed, instead of "validated" to be correct as-is.

    Comments

    Within CWE, the "input validation" term focuses on the act of checking whether an input is already safe, which is different from other techniques that ensure safe processing of input. Carefully perform root-cause analysis to be sure that the issue is not due to techniques that attempt to transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component. If the issue is truly due to imroper input validation, consider using lower-level children such as Improper Use of Validation Framework (CWE-1173) or improper validation involving specific types or properties of input such as Specified Quantity (CWE-1284); Specified Index, Position, or Offset (CWE-1285); Syntactic Correctness (CWE-1286); Specified Type (CWE-1287); Consistency within Input (CWE-1288); or Unsafe Equivalence (CWE-1289).

    Suggestions

    CWE-ID Comment
    CWE-1284 Specified Quantity
    CWE-1285 Specified Index, Position, or Offset
    CWE-1286 Syntactic Correctness
    CWE-1287 Specified Type
    CWE-1288 Consistency within Input
    CWE-1289 Unsafe Equivalence
    CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
    CWE-790 Improper Filtering of Special Elements
    + Notes

    Relationship

    CWE-116 and CWE-20 have a close association because, depending on the nature of the structured message, proper input validation can indirectly prevent special characters from changing the meaning of a structured message. For example, by validating that a numeric ID field should only contain the 0-9 characters, the programmer effectively prevents injection attacks.

    Multiple techniques exist to transform potentially dangerous input into something safe, which is different than "validation," which is a technique to check if an input is already safe. CWE users need to be cautious during root cause analysis to ensure that an issue is truly an input-validation problem.

    Terminology

    The "input validation" term is extremely common, but it is used in many different ways. In some cases its usage can obscure the real underlying weakness or otherwise hide chaining and composite relationships.

    Some people use "input validation" as a general term that covers many different neutralization techniques for ensuring that input is appropriate, such as filtering, i.e., attempting to remove dangerous inputs (related to CWE-790); encoding/escaping, i.e., attempting to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component (related to CWE-116); or canonicalization, which often indirectly removes otherwise-dangerous inputs. Others use the term in a narrower context to simply mean "checking if an input conforms to expectations without changing it." CWE uses this narrow interpretation.

    Note that "input validation" has very different meanings to different people, or within different classification schemes. Caution must be used when referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example, some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control to an attacker over an input when they should not be able to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred to as input validation.

    Finally, it is important to emphasize that the distinctions between input validation and output escaping are often blurred. Developers must be careful to understand the difference, including how input validation is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities, especially when less stringent data types must be supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step since it is a common last name in the English language. However, this valid name cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.

    Maintenance

    As of 2020, this entry is used more often than preferred, and it is a source of frequent confusion. It is being actively modified for CWE 4.1 and subsequent versions.

    Maintenance

    Concepts such as validation, data transformation, and neutralization are being refined, so relationships between CWE-20 and other entries such as CWE-707 may change in future versions, along with an update to the Vulnerability Theory document.

    Maintenance

    Input validation - whether missing or incorrect - is such an essential and widespread part of secure development that it is implicit in many different weaknesses. Traditionally, problems such as buffer overflows and XSS have been classified as input validation problems by many security professionals. However, input validation is not necessarily the only protection mechanism available for avoiding such problems, and in some cases it is not even sufficient. The CWE team has begun capturing these subtleties in chains within the Research Concepts view (CWE-1000), but more work is needed.
    + Taxonomy Mappings
    Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
    7 Pernicious Kingdoms Input validation and representation
    OWASP Top Ten 2004 A1 CWE More Specific Unvalidated Input
    CERT C Secure Coding ERR07-C Prefer functions that support error checking over equivalent functions that don't
    CERT C Secure Coding FIO30-C CWE More Abstract Exclude user input from format strings
    CERT C Secure Coding MEM10-C Define and use a pointer validation function
    WASC 20 Improper Input Handling
    Software Fault Patterns SFP25 Tainted input to variable
    + References
    [REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07.
    <https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.
    [REF-166] Jim Manico. "Input Validation with ESAPI - Very Important". 2008-08-15.
    <https://manicode.blogspot.com/2008/08/input-validation-with-esapi.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
    [REF-45] OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project".
    <https://owasp.org/www-project-enterprise-security-api/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
    [REF-168] Joel Scambray, Mike Shema and Caleb Sima. "Hacking Exposed Web Applications, Second Edition". Input Validation Attacks. McGraw-Hill. 2006-06-05.
    [REF-48] Jeremiah Grossman. "Input validation or output filtering, which is better?". 2007-01-30.
    <https://blog.jeremiahgrossman.com/2007/01/input-validation-or-output-filtering.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
    [REF-170] Kevin Beaver. "The importance of input validation". 2006-09-06.
    <http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid92_gci1214373,00.html>.
    [REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 10, "All Input Is Evil!" Page 341. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
    <https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
    [REF-1109] "LANGSEC: Language-theoretic Security".
    <http://langsec.org/>.
    [REF-1110] "LangSec: Recognition, Validation, and Compositional Correctness for Real World Security".
    <http://langsec.org/bof-handout.pdf>.
    [REF-1111] Sergey Bratus, Lars Hermerschmidt, Sven M. Hallberg, Michael E. Locasto, Falcon D. Momot, Meredith L. Patterson and Anna Shubina. "Curing the Vulnerable Parser: Design Patterns for Secure Input Handling". USENIX ;login:. 2017.
    <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/login_spring17_08_bratus.pdf>.
    [REF-1287] MITRE. "Supplemental Details - 2022 CWE Top 25". Details of Problematic Mappings. 2022-06-28.
    <https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25_supplemental.html#problematicMappingDetails>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
    [REF-1479] Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler and Rama S. Moorthy. "State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation". 2014-07.
    <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx>. (URL validated: 2025-09-05)
    + Content History
    + Submissions
    Submission Date Submitter Organization
    2006-07-19
    (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
    7 Pernicious Kingdoms
    + Contributions
    Contribution Date Contributor Organization
    2024-02-29
    (CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
    Abhi Balakrishnan
    Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.
    + Modifications
    Modification Date Modifier Organization
    2025-12-11
    (CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)
    CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
    2025-09-09
    (CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)
    CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Detection_Factors, References
    2025-04-03
    (CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)
    CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Mapping_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes, Terminology_Notes
    2024-11-19
    (CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)
    CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2024-07-16
    (CWE 4.15, 2024-07-16)
    CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Observed_Examples
    2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Observed_Examples
    2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
    2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References, Relationships
    2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References, Relationships
    2022-06-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
    2022-04-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
    2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
    2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
    2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
    2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
    2019-09-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
    2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
    2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References
    2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
    2017-01-19 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
    2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
    2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations
    2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
    2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationship_Notes
    2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Observed_Examples
    2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
    2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
    2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Potential_Mitigations, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
    2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns
    2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors
    2009-10-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes
    2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns
    2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
    2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
    2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2008-08-15 Veracode
    Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
    2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
    updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
    + Previous Entry Names
    Change Date Previous Entry Name
    2009-01-12 Insufficient Input Validation
    Page Last Updated: January 21, 2026