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import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto'

import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'

import { verifyStandardWebhook } from './standard-webhooks'

/**

* The published Standard Webhooks / Svix test vector (svix `webhook.test.ts`). The key is kept

* as bare base64 and prefixed at runtime so secret scanners don't flag a public sample value.

*/

const VECTOR_KEY_BASE64 = 'MfKQ9r8GKYqrTwjUPD8ILPZIo2LaLaSw'

const VECTOR = {

secret: `whsec_${VECTOR_KEY_BASE64}`,

id: 'msg_p5jXN8AQM9LWM0D4loKWxJek',

timestamp: '1614265330',

body: '{"test": 2432232314}',

signature: 'v1,g0hM9SsE+OTPJTGt/tmIKtSyZlE3uFJELVlNIOLJ1OE=',

}

const VECTOR_NOW_MS = Number(VECTOR.timestamp) * 1000

function signPerSpec(key: Buffer, id: string, timestamp: string, body: string): string {

return createHmac('sha256', key).update(`${id}.${timestamp}.${body}`).digest('base64')

}

function headersFor(values: Record<string, string>, prefix = 'webhook'): Headers {

const headers = new Headers()

for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(values)) headers.set(`${prefix}-${name}`, value)

return headers

}

function verify(

overrides: {

secret?: string

body?: string

id?: string

timestamp?: string

signature?: string

} = {}

) {

return verifyStandardWebhook({

secret: overrides.secret ?? VECTOR.secret,

rawBody: overrides.body ?? VECTOR.body,

headers: headersFor({

id: overrides.id ?? VECTOR.id,

timestamp: overrides.timestamp ?? VECTOR.timestamp,

signature: overrides.signature ?? VECTOR.signature,

}),

})

}

describe('verifyStandardWebhook', () => {

beforeEach(() => {

vi.useFakeTimers()

vi.setSystemTime(VECTOR_NOW_MS)

})

afterEach(() => {

vi.useRealTimers()

})

it('accepts the published test vector', () => {

expect(verify()).toEqual({ valid: true })

})

it('accepts a bare base64 secret without the whsec_ prefix', () => {

expect(verify({ secret: VECTOR_KEY_BASE64 })).toEqual({ valid: true })

})

it('rejects a signature made with a different secret', () => {

const otherKey = Buffer.from('another-signing-secret')

const signature = `v1,${signPerSpec(otherKey, VECTOR.id, VECTOR.timestamp, VECTOR.body)}`

expect(verify({ signature })).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'no_matching_signature' })

})

it('rejects a tampered body, id, or timestamp under the original signature', () => {

const tamperedTimestamp = String(Number(VECTOR.timestamp) + 1)

for (const result of [

verify({ body: '{"test": 2432232315}' }),

verify({ id: 'msg_other' }),

verify({ timestamp: tamperedTimestamp }),

]) {

expect(result).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'no_matching_signature' })

}

})

it.each(['id', 'timestamp', 'signature'])('rejects a missing or empty %s header', (name) => {

for (const value of [null, '']) {

const headers = headersFor({

id: VECTOR.id,

timestamp: VECTOR.timestamp,

signature: VECTOR.signature,

})

if (value === null) headers.delete(`webhook-${name}`)

else headers.set(`webhook-${name}`, value)

expect(

verifyStandardWebhook({ secret: VECTOR.secret, rawBody: VECTOR.body, headers })

).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'missing_headers' })

}

})

it('reads only the header set named by headerPrefix', () => {

const svixHeaders = headersFor(

{ id: VECTOR.id, timestamp: VECTOR.timestamp, signature: VECTOR.signature },

'svix'

)

expect(

verifyStandardWebhook({

secret: VECTOR.secret,

rawBody: VECTOR.body,

headers: svixHeaders,

headerPrefix: 'svix',

})

).toEqual({ valid: true })

expect(

verifyStandardWebhook({ secret: VECTOR.secret, rawBody: VECTOR.body, headers: svixHeaders })

).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'missing_headers' })

})

it('rejects a correctly signed delivery outside the tolerance window, in either direction', () => {

vi.setSystemTime(VECTOR_NOW_MS + 301_000)

expect(verify()).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'timestamp_out_of_tolerance' })

vi.setSystemTime(VECTOR_NOW_MS - 301_000)

expect(verify()).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'timestamp_out_of_tolerance' })

vi.setSystemTime(VECTOR_NOW_MS + 300_000)

expect(verify()).toEqual({ valid: true })

vi.setSystemTime(VECTOR_NOW_MS - 300_000)

expect(verify()).toEqual({ valid: true })

})

it('honors a custom tolerance', () => {

vi.setSystemTime(VECTOR_NOW_MS + 61_000)

const options = {

secret: VECTOR.secret,

rawBody: VECTOR.body,

headers: headersFor({

id: VECTOR.id,

timestamp: VECTOR.timestamp,

signature: VECTOR.signature,

}),

}

expect(verifyStandardWebhook({ ...options, toleranceSeconds: 60 })).toEqual({

valid: false,

reason: 'timestamp_out_of_tolerance',

})

expect(verifyStandardWebhook({ ...options, toleranceSeconds: 120 })).toEqual({ valid: true })

})

it.each(['abc', '1614265330abc', '-1614265330', '1614265330.5'])(

'rejects the non-numeric timestamp %j',

(timestamp) => {

expect(verify({ timestamp })).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'invalid_timestamp' })

}

)

it('accepts when any one of several space-separated signatures matches', () => {

const signature = `v1,Zm9vYmFy v1,${VECTOR.signature.slice(3)} v1,YmF6`

expect(verify({ signature })).toEqual({ valid: true })

})

it.each([

['another version label', `v1a,${VECTOR.signature.slice(3)}`],

['a v2 label', `v2,${VECTOR.signature.slice(3)}`],

['no version label', VECTOR.signature.slice(3)],

['extra comma-separated fields', `${VECTOR.signature},extra`],

])('ignores a correct digest carrying %s', (_, signature) => {

expect(verify({ signature })).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'no_matching_signature' })

})

it('rejects a signature of a different length without throwing', () => {

expect(verify({ signature: 'v1,c2hvcnQ=' })).toEqual({

valid: false,

reason: 'no_matching_signature',

})

expect(verify({ signature: `v1,${'A'.repeat(4096)}` })).toEqual({

valid: false,

reason: 'no_matching_signature',

})

})

it.each(['whsec_not*base64!', 'whsec_abc def'])('rejects the malformed secret %j', (secret) => {

expect(verify({ secret })).toEqual({ valid: false, reason: 'invalid_secret' })

})

it('rejects a delivery signed with an empty key, which anyone could forge', () => {

const forged = `v1,${signPerSpec(Buffer.alloc(0), VECTOR.id, VECTOR.timestamp, VECTOR.body)}`

for (const secret of ['whsec_', 'whsec_A', 'whsec_==']) {

expect(verify({ secret, signature: forged })).toEqual({

valid: false,

reason: 'invalid_secret',

})

}

})

it('agrees with an independent spec signer for a non-ASCII body', () => {

const key = Buffer.from('rotating-secret-bytes')

const body = '{"name":"Zoë 🚀"}'

const signature = `v1,${signPerSpec(key, VECTOR.id, VECTOR.timestamp, body)}`

expect(verify({ secret: `whsec_${key.toString('base64')}`, body, signature })).toEqual({

valid: true,

})

})

})