You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
{{ message }}
Repository navigation
[MNT]: GitHub will restrict pull_request_target on November 2, 2026 #32397
I looked over the workflows and AFAICT, they are following best practices and should be secure. Unfortunately, though those docs say that the policy is now running in evaluate mode, we can't actually see those insights withou an Enterprise subscription.
But we still have a bit of time to fully investigate the workflows before the restrictions are in place
I think the action is for someone with admin rights on the repo to create an event policy allowing pull_request_target for the 4 workflows: labeler.py, conflictcheck.py, pr_welcome.py, autoclose_comment.py.
I looked over the workflows and AFAICT, they are following best practices and should be secure.
I agree, we have removed all permissions on those workflows and the issue is if we pull the actual PR code and run it which those aren't interacting with rather just labeling things based on the trigger itself.
3. I think the action is for someone with admin rights on the repo to create an event policy allowing pull_request_target for the 4 workflows: labeler.py, conflictcheck.py, pr_welcome.py, autoclose_comment.py.
That was my understanding from the linked document. I believe that these 4 workflows should be secure per the comment in zizmor.yml:
# These workflows use pull_request_target solely to obtain write access
# for API operations (labeling, commenting) on fork PRs. None of them
# check out or execute any PR-supplied code.
However, someone should double-check that before making the explicit policies.
Activity
QuLogic commentedon Sep 25, 2026
I looked over the workflows and AFAICT, they are following best practices and should be secure. Unfortunately, though those docs say that the policy is now running in
evaluatemode, we can't actually see those insights withou an Enterprise subscription.But we still have a bit of time to fully investigate the workflows before the restrictions are in place
greglucas commentedon Oct 17, 2026
I think the action is for someone with admin rights on the repo to create an event policy allowing pull_request_target for the 4 workflows:
labeler.py,conflictcheck.py,pr_welcome.py,autoclose_comment.py.I agree, we have removed all permissions on those workflows and the issue is if we pull the actual PR code and run it which those aren't interacting with rather just labeling things based on the trigger itself.
iccir commentedon Oct 17, 2026
That was my understanding from the linked document. I believe that these 4 workflows should be secure per the comment in zizmor.yml:
However, someone should double-check that before making the explicit policies.