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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE-Go file.
package reality
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/hkdf"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/mlkem"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"hash"
"slices"
"time"
"github.com/xtls/reality/tls13"
)
type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
c *Conn
ctx context.Context
serverHello *serverHelloMsg
hello *clientHelloMsg
keyShareKeys *keySharePrivateKeys
session *SessionState
earlySecret *tls13.EarlySecret
binderKey []byte
certReq *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
usingPSK bool
sentDummyCCS bool
suite *cipherSuiteTLS13
transcript hash.Hash
masterSecret *tls13.MasterSecret
trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
echContext *echClientContext
}
// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.keyShareKeys, and,
// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
// The server must not select TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation. See RFC 8446,
// sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
if c.handshakes > 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation")
}
// Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters.
if hs.keyShareKeys == nil || hs.keyShareKeys.ecdhe == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) == 0 {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
return err
}
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if hs.echContext != nil {
hs.echContext.innerTranscript = hs.suite.hash.New()
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.echContext.innerHello, hs.echContext.innerTranscript); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if hs.echContext != nil {
confTranscript := cloneHash(hs.echContext.innerTranscript, hs.suite.hash)
confTranscript.Write(hs.serverHello.original[:30])
confTranscript.Write(make([]byte, 8))
confTranscript.Write(hs.serverHello.original[38:])
h := hs.suite.hash.New
prk, err := hkdf.Extract(h, hs.echContext.innerHello.random, nil)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
acceptConfirmation := tls13.ExpandLabel(h, prk, "ech accept confirmation", confTranscript.Sum(nil), 8)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(acceptConfirmation, hs.serverHello.random[len(hs.serverHello.random)-8:]) == 1 {
hs.hello = hs.echContext.innerHello
c.serverName = c.config.ServerName
hs.transcript = hs.echContext.innerTranscript
c.echAccepted = true
if hs.serverHello.encryptedClientHello != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: unexpected encrypted client hello extension in server hello despite ECH being accepted")
}
if hs.hello.serverName == "" && hs.serverHello.serverNameAck {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: unexpected server_name extension in server hello")
}
} else {
hs.echContext.echRejected = true
}
}
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishHandshakeKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendClientCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendClientFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
if hs.echContext != nil && hs.echContext.echRejected {
c.sendAlert(alertECHRequired)
return &ECHRejectionError{hs.echContext.retryConfigs}
}
c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
return nil
}
// checkServerHelloOrHRR does validity checks that apply to both ServerHello and
// HelloRetryRequest messages. It sets hs.suite.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 using the legacy version field")
}
if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid version after a HelloRetryRequest")
}
if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionTLS12 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an incorrect legacy version")
}
if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling ||
hs.serverHello.ticketSupported ||
hs.serverHello.extendedMasterSecret ||
hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 ||
len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) != 0 ||
len(hs.serverHello.scts) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent a ServerHello extension forbidden in TLS 1.3")
}
if !bytes.Equal(hs.hello.sessionId, hs.serverHello.sessionId) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server did not echo the legacy session ID")
}
if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: server sent non-zero legacy TLS compression method")
}
selectedSuite := mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite)
if hs.suite != nil && selectedSuite != hs.suite {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server changed cipher suite after a HelloRetryRequest")
}
if selectedSuite == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
}
hs.suite = selectedSuite
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
return nil
}
// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
if hs.c.quic != nil {
return nil
}
if hs.sentDummyCCS {
return nil
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord()
}
// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
// resends hs.hello, and reads the new ServerHello into hs.serverHello.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
c := hs.c
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
// HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript
// storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
var isInnerHello bool
hello := hs.hello
if hs.echContext != nil {
chHash = hs.echContext.innerTranscript.Sum(nil)
hs.echContext.innerTranscript.Reset()
hs.echContext.innerTranscript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
hs.echContext.innerTranscript.Write(chHash)
if hs.serverHello.encryptedClientHello != nil {
if len(hs.serverHello.encryptedClientHello) != 8 {
hs.c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: malformed encrypted client hello extension")
}
confTranscript := cloneHash(hs.echContext.innerTranscript, hs.suite.hash)
hrrHello := make([]byte, len(hs.serverHello.original))
copy(hrrHello, hs.serverHello.original)
hrrHello = bytes.Replace(hrrHello, hs.serverHello.encryptedClientHello, make([]byte, 8), 1)
confTranscript.Write(hrrHello)
h := hs.suite.hash.New
prk, err := hkdf.Extract(h, hs.echContext.innerHello.random, nil)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
acceptConfirmation := tls13.ExpandLabel(h, prk, "hrr ech accept confirmation", confTranscript.Sum(nil), 8)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(acceptConfirmation, hs.serverHello.encryptedClientHello) == 1 {
hello = hs.echContext.innerHello
c.serverName = c.config.ServerName
isInnerHello = true
c.echAccepted = true
}
}
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.echContext.innerTranscript); err != nil {
return err
}
} else if hs.serverHello.encryptedClientHello != nil {
// Unsolicited ECH extension should be rejected
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: unexpected encrypted client hello extension in serverHello")
}
// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
// in any change in the ClientHello.
if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
}
if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil {
hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
}
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
}
// If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's
// a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key
// share for it this time.
if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 {
if !slices.Contains(hello.supportedCurves, curveID) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
}
if slices.ContainsFunc(hs.hello.keyShares, func(ks keyShare) bool {
return ks.group == curveID
}) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
}
// Note: we don't support selecting X25519MLKEM768 in a HRR, because it
// is currently first in preference order, so if it's enabled we'll
// always send a key share for it.
//
// This will have to change once we support multiple hybrid KEMs.
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
}
key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), curveID)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.keyShareKeys = &keySharePrivateKeys{curveID: curveID, ecdhe: key}
hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}}
}
if len(hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
if pskSuite == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash {
// Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age.
ticketAge := c.config.time().Sub(time.Unix(int64(hs.session.createdAt), 0))
hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = uint32(ticketAge/time.Millisecond) + hs.session.ageAdd
transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
transcript.Write(chHash)
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := computeAndUpdatePSK(hello, hs.binderKey, transcript, hs.suite.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
hello.pskIdentities = nil
hello.pskBinders = nil
}
}
if hello.earlyData {
hello.earlyData = false
c.quicRejectedEarlyData()
}
if isInnerHello {
// Any extensions which have changed in hello, but are mirrored in the
// outer hello and compressed, need to be copied to the outer hello, so
// they can be properly decompressed by the server. For now, the only
// extension which may have changed is keyShares.
hs.hello.keyShares = hello.keyShares
hs.echContext.innerHello = hello
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.echContext.innerHello, hs.echContext.innerTranscript); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := computeAndUpdateOuterECHExtension(hs.hello, hs.echContext.innerHello, hs.echContext, false); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
hs.hello = hello
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
}
hs.serverHello = serverHello
if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.didHRR = true
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
c := hs.c
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: server sent two HelloRetryRequest messages")
}
if len(hs.serverHello.cookie) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent a cookie in a normal ServerHello")
}
if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension")
}
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
}
if !slices.ContainsFunc(hs.hello.keyShares, func(ks keyShare) bool {
return ks.group == hs.serverHello.serverShare.group
}) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
}
if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
return nil
}
if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK")
}
if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
if pskSuite == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair")
}
hs.usingPSK = true
c.didResume = true
c.peerCertificates = hs.session.peerCertificates
c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse
c.scts = hs.session.scts
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
c := hs.c
ecdhePeerData := hs.serverHello.serverShare.data
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == X25519MLKEM768 {
if len(ecdhePeerData) != mlkem.CiphertextSize768+x25519PublicKeySize {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server X25519MLKEM768 key share")
}
ecdhePeerData = hs.serverHello.serverShare.data[mlkem.CiphertextSize768:]
}
peerKey, err := hs.keyShareKeys.ecdhe.Curve().NewPublicKey(ecdhePeerData)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
}
sharedKey, err := hs.keyShareKeys.ecdhe.ECDH(peerKey)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
}
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == X25519MLKEM768 {
if hs.keyShareKeys.mlkem == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
ciphertext := hs.serverHello.serverShare.data[:mlkem.CiphertextSize768]
mlkemShared, err := hs.keyShareKeys.mlkem.Decapsulate(ciphertext)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid X25519MLKEM768 server key share")
}
sharedKey = append(mlkemShared, sharedKey...)
}
c.curveID = hs.serverHello.serverShare.group
earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
if !hs.usingPSK {
earlySecret = tls13.NewEarlySecret(hs.suite.hash.New, nil)
}
handshakeSecret := earlySecret.HandshakeSecret(sharedKey)
clientSecret := handshakeSecret.ClientHandshakeTrafficSecret(hs.transcript)
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, clientSecret)
serverSecret := handshakeSecret.ServerHandshakeTrafficSecret(hs.transcript)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, serverSecret)
if c.quic != nil {
if c.hand.Len() != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, clientSecret)
c.quicSetReadSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, serverSecret)
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.masterSecret = handshakeSecret.MasterSecret()
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg)
}
if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol, c.quic != nil); err != nil {
// RFC 8446 specifies that no_application_protocol is sent by servers, but
// does not specify how clients handle the selection of an incompatible protocol.
// RFC 9001 Section 8.1 specifies that QUIC clients send no_application_protocol
// in this case. Always sending no_application_protocol seems reasonable.
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
return err
}
c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol
if c.quic != nil {
if encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters == nil {
// RFC 9001 Section 8.2.
c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server did not send a quic_transport_parameters extension")
}
c.quicSetTransportParameters(encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters)
} else {
if encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unexpected quic_transport_parameters extension")
}
}
if !hs.hello.earlyData && encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unexpected early_data extension")
}
if hs.hello.earlyData && !encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
c.quicRejectedEarlyData()
}
if encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
if hs.session.cipherSuite != c.cipherSuite {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: server accepted 0-RTT with the wrong cipher suite")
}
if hs.session.alpnProtocol != c.clientProtocol {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: server accepted 0-RTT with the wrong ALPN")
}
}
if hs.echContext != nil {
if hs.echContext.echRejected {
hs.echContext.retryConfigs = encryptedExtensions.echRetryConfigs
} else if encryptedExtensions.echRetryConfigs != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent encrypted client hello retry configs after accepting encrypted client hello")
}
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
// Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both.
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1.
if hs.usingPSK {
// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this
// is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so
// they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641.
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
if ok {
hs.certReq = certReq
msg, err = c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
}
c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificate.Certificate); err != nil {
return err
}
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
}
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
// We don't use hs.hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms because it might
// include PKCS#1 v1.5 and SHA-1 if the ClientHello also supported TLS 1.2.
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms(c.vers)) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
}
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
c := hs.c
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
}
expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
}
if err := transcriptMsg(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
hs.trafficSecret = hs.masterSecret.ClientApplicationTrafficSecret(hs.transcript)
serverSecret := hs.masterSecret.ServerApplicationTrafficSecret(hs.transcript)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, serverSecret)
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.certReq == nil {
return nil
}
if hs.echContext != nil && hs.echContext.echRejected {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(&certificateMsgTLS13{}, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
cert, err := c.getClientCertificate(&CertificateRequestInfo{
AcceptableCAs: hs.certReq.certificateAuthorities,
SignatureSchemes: hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
Version: c.vers,
ctx: hs.ctx,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
certMsg.certificate = *cert
certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// If we sent an empty certificate message, skip the CertificateVerify.
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
return nil
}
certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, cert, hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
// getClientCertificate returned a certificate incompatible with the
// CertificateRequestInfo supported signature algorithms.
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
}
sig, err := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
c := hs.c
finished := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.trafficSecret)
if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil {
c.resumptionSecret = hs.masterSecret.ResumptionMasterSecret(hs.transcript)
}
if c.quic != nil {
if c.hand.Len() != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.suite.id, hs.trafficSecret)
}
return nil
}
func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error {
if !c.isClient {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client")
}
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
return nil
}
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1.
if msg.lifetime == 0 {
return nil
}
lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second
if lifetime > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime")
}
if len(msg.label) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with empty opaque ticket label")
}
// RFC 9001, Section 4.6.1
if c.quic != nil && msg.maxEarlyData != 0 && msg.maxEarlyData != 0xffffffff {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid early data for QUIC connection")
}
cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
psk := tls13.ExpandLabel(cipherSuite.hash.New, c.resumptionSecret, "resumption",
msg.nonce, cipherSuite.hash.Size())
session := c.sessionState()
session.secret = psk
session.useBy = uint64(c.config.time().Add(lifetime).Unix())
session.ageAdd = msg.ageAdd
session.EarlyData = c.quic != nil && msg.maxEarlyData == 0xffffffff // RFC 9001, Section 4.6.1
session.ticket = msg.label
if c.quic != nil && c.quic.enableSessionEvents {
c.quicStoreSession(session)
return nil
}
cs := &ClientSessionState{session: session}
if cacheKey := c.clientSessionCacheKey(); cacheKey != "" {
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, cs)
}
return nil
}
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