DDD: Augmentation Conditions Bounded Context

Status: Living document Date: 2026-09-14 Scope: Grading and instrumenting every surface where a human decides on an agent's behalf, against the six conditions of arXiv 2609.12482 Governed by: ADR-2010, ADR-2011, PRD

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1. Bounded Context

The Augmentation Conditions context owns the grading of human–agent decision surfaces and the instrumentation that makes the grade measurable. It does not own decisions (Judgment Broker), standing regulation (Harness Engineering) or identity (Identity Spine). It consumes their events and produces three things: an effective escalation posture per case, a set of receipts that close the recovery loop, and reviewer-level telemetry.

The Judgment Broker context asks "was this decision made and routed?". This context asks "could the human who made it have caught a failure, did they learn whether it applied, and are they still able to do this next year?".

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2. Context Map

Context	Relationship	Notes
Judgment Broker	Upstream supplier	Supplies BrokerCase, ActionRequest, ActionResponse, DecisionOutcome. This context adds TaskProperties, effective tier, application receipts, delegation admission.
Harness Engineering	Upstream supplier / Shared kernel	Harness template escalation_rules[] carry the panel's task-property defaults and calibration_sample_rate; the Precedent aggregate, when rebuilt, must satisfy C4.
Identity Spine	Conformist	Reviewer, delegatee, probe agent and manual executor are all did:nostr; system:whelk-gate is a reserved non-DID actor for reasoner outcomes.
Intent Legibility (D7)	Shared kernel	The intent envelope field is persisted here and compared with the act. The D7 honesty rule (never fabricate) generalises to rationale and confidence.
Forum Social Dynamics (F10)	Sibling	F10's escalation-on-amplification and this context's escalation-on-age share the same receipt vocabulary.
Ecosystem Alignment	Downstream	The compatibility matrix's augmentation-conditions table reads this context's status vocabulary.
Dream cycle (CP-07)	Downstream	Ledger gains reviewer identity and review minutes; the human's learning is a first-class column.

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3. Ubiquitous Language

Term	Definition
Augmentation condition (C1–C6)	One of the six grading questions. C1–C3 are snapshot; C4–C6 are longitudinal and need two measurements to mean anything.
Task-property triple	{verifiability, reversibility, stakes} declared by an operator on a panel; a request may tighten it. Owned by nostr-bbs-core.
Declared tier	The requesting agent's risk_tier. Telemetry only.
Effective tier	Output of effective_tier(panel, request, declared). The only tier stored, rendered or used for suppression.
Vacuous verification	A signed decision made without the proposal, provenance or a human-authored rationale in view. The failure mode this context exists to remove.
Application receipt	A receipt stage past projection-committed: consumer-received, applied, not-applied, applied-manually. Owned by the mutation owner, published to the forum.
Escalated-on-age	A side receipt the relay cron emits when a pending case exceeds the panel's max_pending_hours.
Calibration sample	A Low/Reversible request selected by a keyed HMAC of its id under a relay secret (compared against calibration_sample_rate) to be shown rather than suppressed, so reviewers keep exposure to routine agent output. Keyed, not merely deterministic: the agent chooses the id, so an unkeyed hash lets it grind for an id that is never sampled (found and fixed in forum commit 67d0d71).
Probe	A known-bad request tagged probe=<sha256> by a registered probe agent; the tag is hidden until decided. The share rejected is the catch rate.
Override rate	Share of a reviewer's decisions whose outcome differs from the agent's requested action.
Warranted escalation	A decided case where the human outcome differed from the request, the human amended, or intent_match == false. Numerator of HITL Precision.
Intent match	Whether the persisted declared intent names the operation and target actually recorded for the act. null when no intent was declared.
Delegation admission	The relay rule that admits a 31403 from a reviewer-role DID only for a case an admin has Delegated to them.
Manual continuation	An operator executing an already-approved operation by hand during mesh unavailability, evidenced by an applied-manually receipt bound to the approved operation digest.

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4. Aggregates

Aggregate	Owner	Description
TaskProperties	nostr-rust-forum (nostr-bbs-core)	Value object on panel and request; tightening-only merge; serialised as tags tp-verifiability, tp-reversibility, tp-stakes.
EffectiveTier	nostr-rust-forum (nostr-bbs-core)	Pure function result, stored on broker_cases.effective_tier.
ApplicationReceipt	agentbox (ApplicationReceiptStore) as mutation owner; VisionClaw for elevation cases	Local write-once record; mirrored to the forum via the receipts endpoint.
ReviewerTelemetry	nostr-rust-forum (auth worker)	Read model over broker_decisions × broker_cases × governance_receipts.
AgentTrajectory (+ intent, intent_match)	VisionClaw	Per-action row; the workflow record's "agent path".
HitlPrecision	VisionClaw (kpi_compute.rs)	Warranted ÷ decided, with denominator reported.
Delegation	nostr-rust-forum	Delegate{to} outcome projected to case_delegations; consulted by the 31403 gate.
CalibrationPolicy	nostr-rust-forum (relay) + VisionFlow harness template	calibration_sample_rate, max_pending_hours, probe agent DID.
AugmentationMatrixRow	VisionFlow	{condition, substrate, status, citation}; the ledger row in the compatibility matrix.

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5. Domain Events

Event	Producer	Consumers
EffectiveTierAssigned {case_id, declared, effective}	relay	client, reviewer telemetry
ApplicationReceiptPublished {response_event_id, stage}	agentbox / VisionClaw	forum receipts, client decision chain
CaseEscalatedOnAge {case_id, age_hours}	relay cron	client badge, reviewer telemetry
CaseDelegated {case_id, from, to}	forum (human)	relay gate, telemetry
CalibrationSampleShown {request_id}	relay	telemetry
ProbeDecided {request_id, caught}	relay	telemetry catch rate
IntentRecorded {agent_did, intent, intent_match}	VisionClaw hub tap	/api/trace, HITL precision
ManualContinuationRecorded {case_id, executed_by}	agentbox	forum receipts, PROV-O
AuthorityDenied {agent_did, stage, reason}	agentbox authority gate	execution journal, /v1/agent-events

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6. Invariants

1. No fabricated judgement. A rationale, intent or confidence is either authored by the human or agent it is attributed to, or absent. A surface that fills the slot is non-conformant.
2. Tightening only. merge(panel, request) never yields a looser property than panel. Property test in nostr-bbs-core.
3. Effective tier is authoritative. No consumer reads risk_tier for suppression or routing after this context lands.
4. Human resolves high and critical. A case with effective tier ≥ high reaches Decided only through a human 31403; applied-manually presupposes a prior Approve.
5. Receipts are monotonic. consumer-received precedes applied | not-applied | applied-manually; a stage never regresses; escalated-on-age and expired are side receipts that do not advance the ladder.
6. Delegation is scoped. A delegatee may decide only the delegated case; the delegation itself remains in the chain and is attributable to the admin.
7. Probes are blind until decided. The probe tag is never rendered before the 31403 exists.
8. System actors are not humans. system:whelk-gate outcomes are excluded from every human-reviewer series.
9. Oversight selection is unpredictable to the overseen. Any sampling or probe selection that decides whether an agent's action is shown to a human takes a secret the agent does not hold as an input. A selection an agent can compute is a selection an agent can evade.
10. Longitudinal rows start as baselines. The first measured status on C4–C6 is a baseline; a pass requires a second measurement no earlier than 90 days later.

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7. Services

Service	Owner	Responsibility
effective_tier()	nostr-bbs-core	Pure boundary function (ADR-2011)
Relay ageing cron	relay worker	Emits escalated-on-age
Receipts endpoint	auth worker	Accepts application stages under NIP-98
Reviewer telemetry endpoint	auth worker	Serves per-reviewer read model
Receipt publisher	agentbox broker-bridge	Mirrors ApplicationReceiptStore to the forum
governance_manual_continue	agentbox MCP	Records manual continuation
Intent persister / matcher	VisionClaw hub tap	Persists intent, computes intent_match
HITL precision	VisionClaw kpi_compute	Warranted ÷ decided
Matrix grader	VisionFlow scripts	Validates citations in the augmentation table

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8. Ownership Summary

Substrate	Owns	Does not own
nostr-rust-forum	TaskProperties, effective tier, delegation admission, receipts and telemetry endpoints, ageing cron, decision UI rationale capture	Application outcome truth (mutation owner), intent, KPIs
agentbox	Application receipts as mutation owner, manual continuation, authority-deny journal, triple derivation from authority_class	Panel defaults, relay gates
VisionClaw	Intent persistence and matching, HITL precision, elevation TTL/reconciliation, case-queue rationale capture	Protocol schema, receipts endpoint
VisionFlow	The lens: matrix table, CP acceptance frame, terminology, this context	Any runtime

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9. Open Issues

1. Reviewer telemetry is only as good as the client's created_at; requests published by agents with skewed clocks distort time-to-decision. Relay accepted_at is preferred where present.
2. Probe agents must be excluded from Augmentation Ratio's denominator or they inflate it.
3. Amend has no UI even after this PRD; it is the natural carrier for "approve with change" and should be the next forum client increment.
4. The precedent system, when rebuilt, must record which human decisions it generalised and expire when the reviewer population changes (C4).
5. Probe blindness is one-sided today (forum KF-10). The probe tag is hidden from every relay projection and from the client, which protects the reviewer's blindness, but it still rides the raw signed 31402, so the agent being measured can recognise its own probes and the catch rate is not yet trustworthy against a motivated agent. The durable design is for probes to carry no tag at all: the registered probe agent publishes requests indistinguishable from real ones and submits the set of probe event ids to the relay out of band (a signed list, or an HMAC-keyed selection like calibration, per invariant 9), and the relay marks them only after the 31403 exists. This is ADR-2011's (forum) review trigger.