CWE - CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key (4.19.1)
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    CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key

    Weakness ID: 321
    Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
    Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
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    + Description
    The product uses a hard-coded, unchangeable cryptographic key. Diagram for CWE-321
    + Common Consequences
    Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
    Impact Details

    Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Read Application Data

    		Scope: Access Control

    If hard-coded cryptographic keys are used, it is almost certain that malicious users will gain access through the account in question. The use of a hard-coded cryptographic key significantly increases the possibility that encrypted data may be recovered.
    + Potential Mitigations
    Phase(s) Mitigation

    Architecture and Design
    Prevention schemes mirror that of hard-coded password storage.
    + Relationships
    Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
    + Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
    PeerOf Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 259 Use of Hard-coded Password
    PeerOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1291 Public Key Re-Use for Signing both Debug and Production Code
    CanFollow Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 656 Reliance on Security Through Obscurity
    + Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
    + Relevant to the view "CISQ Quality Measures (2020)" (View-1305)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
    + Relevant to the view "CISQ Data Protection Measures" (View-1340)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
    + Modes Of Introduction
    Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
    Phase Note
    Architecture and Design REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
    + Applicable Platforms
    Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
    Languages

    Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

    Technologies

    Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)

    + Likelihood Of Exploit
    High
    + Demonstrative Examples

    Example 1


    The following code examples attempt to verify a password using a hard-coded cryptographic key.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: C 
    int VerifyAdmin(char *password) {
    if (strcmp(password,"68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {

    printf("Incorrect Password!\n");
    return(0);
    }
    printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode...\n");
    return(1);
    }
    (bad code)
    Example Language: Java 
    public boolean VerifyAdmin(String password) {
    if (password.equals("68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {
    System.out.println("Entering Diagnostic Mode...");
    return true;
    }
    System.out.println("Incorrect Password!");
    return false;
    (bad code)
    Example Language: C# 
    int VerifyAdmin(String password) {
    if (password.Equals("68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {
    Console.WriteLine("Entering Diagnostic Mode...");
    return(1);
    }
    Console.WriteLine("Incorrect Password!");
    return(0);
    }

    The cryptographic key is within a hard-coded string value that is compared to the password. It is likely that an attacker will be able to read the key and compromise the system.



    Example 2


    In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

    Multiple vendors used hard-coded keys for critical functionality in their OT products.



    + Selected Observed Examples

    Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

    Reference Description
    Engineering Workstation uses hard-coded cryptographic keys that could allow for unathorized filesystem access and privilege escalation
    Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a hard-coded SSH private key that is likely to be used by default.
    WiFi router service has a hard-coded encryption key, allowing root access
    Communications / collaboration product has a hardcoded SSH private key, allowing access to root account
    + Weakness Ordinalities
    Ordinality Description
    Primary
    (where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
    + Detection Methods
    Method Details

    Automated Static Analysis
    Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

    Effectiveness: High
    + Memberships
    Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 719 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A8 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 720 OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A9 - Insecure Communications
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 729 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A8 - Insecure Storage
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 950 SFP Secondary Cluster: Hardcoded Sensitive Data
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1439 OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A04:2025 - Cryptographic Failures
    + Vulnerability Mapping Notes
    Usage ALLOWED
    (this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
    Reason Acceptable-Use

    Rationale

    		This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

    Comments

    		Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
    + Notes

    Other

    The main difference between the use of hard-coded passwords and the use of hard-coded cryptographic keys is the false sense of security that the former conveys. Many people believe that simply hashing a hard-coded password before storage will protect the information from malicious users. However, many hashes are reversible (or at least vulnerable to brute force attacks) -- and further, many authentication protocols simply request the hash itself, making it no better than a password.
    + Taxonomy Mappings
    Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
    CLASP Use of hard-coded cryptographic key
    OWASP Top Ten 2007 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Cryptographic Storage
    OWASP Top Ten 2007 A9 CWE More Specific Insecure Communications
    OWASP Top Ten 2004 A8 CWE More Specific Insecure Storage
    Software Fault Patterns SFP33 Hardcoded sensitive data
    ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.10 RE(1)
    ISA/IEC 62443 Part 2-4 Req SP.03.10 RE(3)
    ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 1.5
    ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.3
    ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-1 Req SD-1
    ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req SR 4.3
    ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 7.3
    + References
    [REF-18] Secure Software, Inc.. "The CLASP Application Security Process". 2005.
    <https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf>. (URL validated: 2024-11-17)
    [REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
    <https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.
    + Content History
    + Submissions
    Submission Date Submitter Organization
    2006-07-19
    (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)     		CLASP
    + Contributions
    Contribution Date Contributor Organization
    2023-01-24
    (CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)     		"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
    Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
    2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
    Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
    + Modifications
    Modification Date Modifier Organization
    2025-12-11
    (CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
    2025-04-03
    (CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram
    2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Mapping_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References
    2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2020-12-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2020-08-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated References, Relationships, Type
    2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
    2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
    2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences
    2010-12-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2010-09-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples
    2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
    2008-08-15 Veracode
    Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
    2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
    updated Time_of_Introduction
    Page Last Updated: January 21, 2026