CWE - CWE-1274: Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code (4.20)
Home > CWE List > CWE-1274: Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code (4.20)  
ID
  • Home
  • Who We Are User Stories History Documents Videos
  • Basics
    Root Cause Mapping   ►
    Guidance Quick Tips Examples
    How to Contribute Weakness Content FAQs Glossary
  • Top-N Lists   ►
    Top 25 Software Top Hardware Top 10 KEV Weaknesses
    CWE List   ►
    Current Version Reports Visualizations Releases Archive
    Downloads REST API
  • News   ►
    Current News Blog Podcast News Archive
    CWE Board Working Groups & Special Interest Groups Email Lists
  • Search CWE List Search Website

    CWE-1274: Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code

    Weakness ID: 1274
    Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
    Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
    View customized information:
    For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.
    ×

    Edit Custom Filter


    + Description
    The product conducts a secure-boot process that transfers bootloader code from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) into Volatile Memory (VM), but it does not have sufficient access control or other protections for the Volatile Memory.
    + Extended Description

    Adversaries could bypass the secure-boot process and execute their own untrusted, malicious boot code.

    As a part of a secure-boot process, the read-only-memory (ROM) code for a System-on-Chip (SoC) or other system fetches bootloader code from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) and stores the code in Volatile Memory (VM), such as dynamic, random-access memory (DRAM) or static, random-access memory (SRAM). The NVM is usually external to the SoC, while the VM is internal to the SoC. As the code is transferred from NVM to VM, it is authenticated by the SoC's ROM code.

    + Common Consequences
    Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
    Impact Details

    Modify Memory; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

    		Scope: Access Control, Integrity

    Likelihood: High
    If the volatile-memory-region protections or access controls are insufficient to prevent modifications from an adversary or untrusted agent, the secure boot may be bypassed or replaced with the execution of an adversary's code.
    + Potential Mitigations
    Phase(s) Mitigation

    Architecture and Design
    Ensure that the design of volatile-memory protections is enough to prevent modification from an adversary or untrusted code.

    Testing
    Test the volatile-memory protections to ensure they are safe from modification or untrusted code.
    + Relationships
    Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
    + Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
    Nature Type ID Name
    ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 284 Improper Access Control
    + Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1196 Security Flow Issues
    + Modes Of Introduction
    Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
    Phase Note
    Architecture and Design This weakness can be introduced during hardware architecture or design but can be identified later during testing.
    + Applicable Platforms
    Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
    Languages

    Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

    Operating Systems

    Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

    Architectures

    Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

    Technologies

    Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

    + Demonstrative Examples

    Example 1


    A typical SoC secure boot's flow includes fetching the next piece of code (i.e., the boot loader) from NVM (e.g., serial, peripheral interface (SPI) flash), and transferring it to DRAM/SRAM volatile, internal memory, which is more efficient.

    (bad code)
    Example Language: Other 
    The volatile-memory protections or access controls are insufficient.

    The memory from where the boot loader executes can be modified by an adversary.

    (good code)
    Example Language: Other 
    A good architecture should define appropriate protections or access controls to prevent modification by an adversary or untrusted agent, once the bootloader is authenticated.


    + Selected Observed Examples

    Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

    Reference Description
    Locked memory regions may be modified through other interfaces in a secure-boot-loader image due to improper access control.
    + Weakness Ordinalities
    Ordinality Description
    Primary
    (where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
    + Detection Methods
    Method Details

    Manual Analysis
    Ensure the volatile memory is lockable or has locks. Ensure the volatile memory is locked for writes from untrusted agents or adversaries. Try modifying the volatile memory from an untrusted agent, and ensure these writes are dropped.

    Effectiveness: High

    Manual Analysis

    Analyze the device using the following steps:

    1. Identify all fabric master agents that are active during system Boot Flow when initial code is loaded from Non-volatile storage to volatile memory.
    2. Identify the volatile memory regions that are used for storing loaded system executable program.
    3. During system boot, test programming the identified memory regions in step 2 from all the masters identified in step 1.

    Only trusted masters should be allowed to write to the memory regions. For example, pluggable device peripherals should not have write access to program load memory regions.

    Effectiveness: Moderate
    + Memberships
    Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
    Nature Type ID Name
    MemberOf ViewView - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1343 Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses List
    MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control
    + Vulnerability Mapping Notes
    Usage ALLOWED
    (this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
    Reason Acceptable-Use

    Rationale

    		This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

    Comments

    		Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
    + Content History
    + Submissions
    Submission Date Submitter Organization
    2020-04-25
    (CWE 4.1, 2020-02-24)     		Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation
    + Contributions
    Contribution Date Contributor Organization
    2021-10-22 Hareesh Khattri Intel Corporation
    provided detection method
    2021-10-20 Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Lattice Semiconductor
    suggested content improvements
    + Modifications
    Modification Date Modifier Organization
    2025-12-11
    (CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Description
    2025-04-03
    (CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples
    2024-02-29
    (CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Detection_Factors
    2023-06-29
    (CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Mapping_Notes
    2023-04-27
    (CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Relationships
    2023-01-31
    (CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns
    2022-04-28
    (CWE 4.7, 2022-04-28)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Related_Attack_Patterns
    2021-10-28
    (CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
    2020-08-20
    (CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)     		CWE Content Team MITRE
    updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
    + Previous Entry Names
    Change Date Previous Entry Name
    2021-10-28 Insufficient Protections on the Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code
    Page Last Updated: April 30, 2026