- Home
-
CWE-1267: Policy Uses Obsolete Encoding
Weakness ID: 1267Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.View customized information:For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.×
Edit Custom Filter
Within a System-On-a-Chip (SoC), various circuits and hardware engines generate transactions for the purpose of accessing (read/write) assets or performing various actions (e.g., reset, fetch, compute, etc.). Among various types of message information, a typical transaction is comprised of source identity (identifying the originator of the transaction) and a destination identity (routing the transaction to the respective entity). Sometimes the transactions are qualified with a Security Token. This Security Token helps the destination agent decide on the set of allowed actions (e.g., access to an asset for reads and writes). A policy encoder is used to map the bus transactions to Security Tokens that in turn are used as access-controls/protection mechanisms. A common weakness involves using an encoding which is no longer trusted, i.e., an obsolete encoding.
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
Impact Details Modify Memory; Read Memory; Modify Files or Directories; Read Files or Directories; DoS: Resource Consumption (Other); Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Reduce Reliability
Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control Likelihood: High Phase(s) Mitigation Architecture and Design; Implementation
Security Token Decoders should be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
Access and programming flows should be tested in both pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.
Effectiveness: High
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name ChildOf
Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
284 Improper Access Control
Relevant to the view "Hardware Design" (View-1194)
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
1198 Privilege Separation and Access Control Issues
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
Phase Note Architecture and Design Implementation
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Languages Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Operating Systems Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Architectures Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Technologies Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Example 1
For example, consider a system that has four bus masters. The table below provides bus masters, their Security Tokens, and trust assumptions.
Bus Master Security Token Decoding Trust Assumptions Master_0 "00" Untrusted Master_1 "01" Trusted Master_2 "10" Untrusted Master_3 "11" Untrusted The policy encoding is to be defined such that Security Token will be used in implemented access-controls. The bits in the bus transaction that contain Security-Token information are Bus_transaction [15:11]. The assets are the AES-Key registers for encryption or decryption. The key of 128 bits is implemented as a set of four, 32-bit registers.
Register Field description AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 AES key [0:31] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_1 AES key [32:63] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_2 AES key [64:95] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_4 AES key [96:127] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000 Below is an example of a policy encoding scheme inherited from a previous project where all "ODD" numbered Security Tokens are trusted.
(bad code)Example Language: PseudocodeIf (Bus_transaction[14] == "1")Trusted = "1"ElseTrusted = "0"If (trusted)Allow access to AES-Key registersElseDeny access to AES-Key registersThe inherited policy encoding is obsolete and does not work for the new system where an untrusted bus master with an odd Security Token exists in the system, i.e., Master_3 whose Security Token is "11". Based on the old policy, the untrusted bus master (Master_3) has access to the AES-Key registers. To resolve this, a register AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY can be defined to provide necessary, access controls:
New Policy:
AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY [31:0] Default 0x00000002 - agent with Security Token "1" has access to AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 through AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_4 registers The AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY register defines which agents with a Security Token in the transaction can access the AES-key registers. Each bit in this 32-bit register defines a Security Token. There could be a maximum of 32 security Tokens that are allowed access to the AES-key registers. The number of the bit when set (i.e., "1") allows respective action from an agent whose identity matches the number of the bit and, if "0" (i.e., Clear), disallows the respective action to that corresponding agent. Thus, any bus master with Security Token "01" is allowed access to the AES-Key registers. Below is the Pseudo Code for policy encoding:
(good code)Example Language: PseudocodeSecurity_Token[4:0] = Bus_transaction[15:11]If (AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY[Security_Token] == "1")Allow access to AES-Key registersElseDeny access to AES-Key registers
Ordinality Description Primary(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1396 Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control Usage ALLOWED (this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)Reason Acceptable-Use Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities. Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction. [REF-1093] Brandon Hill. "Huge Intel CPU Bug Allegedly Causes Kernel Memory Vulnerability With Up To 30% Performance Hit In Windows And Linux". 2018-01-02.
<https://hothardware.com/news/intel-cpu-bug-kernel-memory-isolation-linux-windows-macos>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)More information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter.Page Last Updated: April 30, 2026Use of the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) and the associated references from this website are subject to the Terms of Use. CWE is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and managed by the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) which is operated by The MITRE Corporation (MITRE). Copyright © 2006–2026, The MITRE Corporation. CWE, CWSS, CWRAF, and the CWE logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.



